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Bhaṭṭa Jayanta: 
Comprehension, Knowledge, and the Reduction of Testimony to Inference1 
Alessandro Graheli 
 
The present paper is an analysis of the defense of the epistemological autonomy 
of verbal testimony (śabda), against its reduction to inference, as found in 
Bhaṭṭa Jayanta’s Nyāyamañjarī. The article identifies the Vaiśeṣika, Buddhist 
and Sāṅkhya positions hinted at in the Nyāyamañjarī, and it analyses the reuse 
by Jayanta of the arguments conceived by the Mīmāṃsā philosopher Kumārila. 
Unlike for Mīmāṃsakas, according to Jayanta the relation between language 
and reality is established by convention, but in its day-to-day usage it is clear 
that an a priori connection is a necessary condition for linguistic 
communication, so that the distinction between a fixed connection and a 
conventional one weakens. The analysis of Jayanta leads to two general 
conclusions: 1. In ancient Nyāya as attested by Jayanta there is no distinction 
between non-committal understanding and committal knowledge from words. 
Consequently, 2. in ancient Nyāya as attested by Jayanta the language is 
primarily examined from an epistemological viewpoint, as the conveyer of true 
statements. There are no “neutral” statements, and false statements are in fact 
inappropriate uses of language. 
 
1. Introduction 
The reasons why we place any credit in witnesses and historians, is not derived from any connexion, which we 
perceive a priori, between testimony and reality, but because we are accustomed to find a conformity between 
them  
(D. Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding)  
 
1.1. The reduction of śabda to inference 
The present paper is an analysis of the defense of the epistemological autonomy of verbal testimony 
(śabda), against its reduction to inference, as found in Bhaṭṭa Jayanta’s Nyāyamañjarı.̄ This study has 
                                                             
 
1 This paper is in part based on the copies of manuscripts gathered during projects G1160-M15, P17244, P19328 and P24388, 
granted by the FWF (Fonds zur Förderung der wissenschaftlichen Forschung), and archived at the ISTB, University of Vien-
na. I am grateful to Karin Preisendanz, who allowed me to use such material. Elisa Freschi read an early draft of this paper 
and suggested valuable improvements. She also found useful parallels from Mım̄āṃsā sources, thus enhancing the scope of 
this research. 
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been inspired by pioneering papers on the same passages of the NM, notably Matilal 1994 and Taber 
1996. The present effort is more textually-oriented and aims at a contribution in the following 
respects: 
• A more complete presentation of Jayanta’s perspective on the issue.  
• A deeper analysis of the relation of Jayanta’s arguments with Kumārila’s.  
• A systematic identification and clarification of the Vaiśeṣika, Buddhist and Sāṅkhya positions on 
the issue, as found in the NM.  
 
Jayanta, an exponent of old Nyāya, stages a debate that integrates arguments from Mım̄āṃsaka, 
Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya and Buddhist sources.2 Like Kumārila, by whom he is undoubtedly inspired, 
Jayanta does not explicitly label the various schools and positions, although these are more tidily 
arranged in Jayanta’s presentation. In short, the Vaiśeṣika arguments in favor of a reduction of śabda 
to inference concern the necessary relation among the instrument of knowledge and the object of 
knowledge (artha),3 on which both inference and śabda are based, as well as the unperceived artha 
which distinguishes both inference and śabda from direct perception. Quite differently, the Buddhist 
reduction mainly hinges on the inference of the intention of the speaker and on his 
authoritativeness. The Sāṅkhya defense of an independent epistemological status of śabda is based on 
the peculiarity of the need of a speaker, of his intention, and of specific processess on the side of the 
hearer, peculiarities not found in inference; the Sāṅkhya arguments, however, are considered 
inconclusive by Kumārila and Jayanta.  
Some of the pre-Kumārila arguments and objections are summed up by Taber (1996: 22-23). In 
the present paper further more parallels from Nyāya, Buddhism, Vaiśeṣika, and Mım̄āṃsā sources are 
provided, although an exhausting collection of Jayanta’s sources goes beyond the scope of this paper 
and needs to be carried on elsewhere.  
 
                                                             
 
2 As a general indication for non-specialists, the Nyāya tradition largely deals with problems of epistemology, dialectics and 
logic; Mīmāṃsā is mostly concerned with the interpretation of the Veda and defense of its authority; and Sāṅkhya is mostly 
known as a system of metaphysics. These three accept śabda as an instrument of knowledge, independent from inference. In 
Vaiśeṣika, also a system of metaphysics, and in Buddhism, which in the present debate refers to the epistemology of Diṅnāga 
and Dharmakīrti, śabda is reduced to inference. For further details, see the introduction of the present volume. 
3 For the purposes of this paper, rendering śabda with “verbal testimony”, “linguistic expression”, etc., and artha with “ob-
ject of knowledge”, “meaning”, etc., would be a potentially misleading choice. Since the discussion always revolves around 
śabda and artha, they will be left untranslated, in the hope that the context will help to understand their import better than 
an arbitrary English equivalent. 
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1.2. Understanding words and knowing from words 
Upon hearing a linguistic expression, the epistemic reaction of the hearer could be considered 
committal, non-committal, or both. The issue is eloquently put by Matilal (1994: 348) as follows:  
It is frequently heard “I understand what you mean” and along with it comes the 
disclaimer “but I do not accept it”. As knowledge or belief is based upon total acceptance, 
such an understanding of what the speaker means can hardly amount to knowledge on 
the part of the auditor. […] then understanding (and the attendant interpretation) can be 
the intermediate stage in providing us with the final knowledge or belief that we may 
possibly derive from the testimony of […] any […] knowledgeable person.  
 
According to Matilal (1994: 355) this scenario is not endorsed in Nyāya: “The Naiyāyikas were 
against the deployment of such a basic attitude prior to the belief-claim or knowledge claim that 
arises in the hearer”.  
Taber (1996: 20), while studying arguments in favour and against the reduction of verbal 
testimony to inference, noticed that this claim of an absence of distinction between committal and 
non-committal knowledge from words may not be applicable to Nyāya tout court:  
[…] I would like to suggest a minor qualification of Matilal’s interpretation of the Nyāya 
position. While it is indeed the case that Nyāya, especially later Nyāya, rejects an initial 
grasp of the meaning of a statement as the author’s thought or intention, it nevertheless 
does make a distinction between apprehending the meaning of a statement and 
apprehending its truth.  
 
Taber cautions that his criticism of Matilal’s characterisation of Nyāya is specifically based on 
the point of view of Jayanta, who flourished at the end of the 9th century. Taber, however, also thinks 
that this point of view can be extended to other Nyāya sources (Taber 1996: 20).  
 
1.3. Jayanta and Mım̄āṃsā 
As in other sections of the NM, also in the passage studied here Jayanta extensively quotes and draws 
ideas from Mīmāṃsā works, and most often from Kumārila Bhaṭṭa’s Ślokavārttika. But he also 
distances himself from Mım̄āṃsā tenets not acceptable by Naiyāyikas. More specifically, for the 
present purposes, the assumption of the artha of individual words as a qualified individual (tadvat) is 
an essential aspect in which Jayanta differs from Kumārila and other Mım̄āṃsakas, according to 
whom the artha is primarily a universal. Jayanta’s reuses of Kumārila’s statements should thus be 
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read, mutatis mutandis, with such distinctions in mind, for even when Kumārila’s words are cited 
verbatim it is quite possible that terms denote radically different concepts in the two schools and are 
thus diversely intended by Jayanta, in the flow of his argumentation.  
 
2. The context 
2.1. The Nyāyamañjarı ̄
Bhaṭṭa Jayanta’s Nyāyamañjarı ̄ is a treatise on the tenets of Nyāya, the system of epistemology, 
dialectics and logic traditionally rooted in the Nyāyasūtra of Akṣapāda Gotama (c. 200–400 CE). The 
NM was composed at the end of the 9th c. CE and it unfolds in 12 parts, called āhnika-s (“daily 
lessons”).4 
From NM 3 to NM 6, almost half of the whole NM, Jayanta debates issues related to the 
acquisition of knowledge from śabda. A crucial passage, the topic of this paper, concerns the status of 
śabda as an autonomous instrument of knowledge, or whether it should rather be reduced to 
inference. The issue of the reduction of śabda to inference has already engaged scholars such as 
Matilal, Chakrabarti, Taber and Ganeri, so there is not much scope to say something new. The goal of 
this paper is to present again the gist of their arguments in the flow of Jayanta’s own treatment, to 
give them some new perspective, just like “flowers from previous chaplets may generate a new 
interest when rearranged on a new string.”5  
Jayanta’s eloquence in representing views that oppose his own Nyāya tradition, to the extent 
that scholars often turn to the NM to figure out the original views, is well known.6 The reason behind 
the popularity of the NM in modern studies, however, can be traced back not only to Jayanta’s lucid 
and natural style of Sanskrit, but also to his strategically arranged questions and answers. The 
efficacy of philosophical arguments staged in a dialogical form is brilliantly captured by Gadamer 
(2000, II, 3, c: 746):  
The essence of the question is that it has a sense. A sense, however, is a direction. The 
sense of a question is thus the direction in which the answer must result, if it expects to 
                                                             
 
4 An overview of the textual transmission and of the contents of the NM, as well as details on Jayanta’s time and life, can be 
found in Graheli (2015, chapter 1). 
5 vacovinyāsavaicitryamātram atra vicāryatām // tair eva kusumaiḥ pūrvam asakṛt kṛtaśekharāḥ / apūrvaracane dāmni dadhaty eva 
kutūhalam // (NMVa, I 3, 5–6). 
6 E. g., see Kataoka (2008: 3): “Jayanta explains Kumārila’s discussions in a lucid manner […] Jayanta’s Nyāyamañjarı ̄ can be 
used as a kind of commentary on or introduction to the Mım̄āṃsāślokavārttika”. 
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be a meaningful, significant answer. The question puts the object of inquiry into a 
specific perspective.7 
 
Jayanta’s style of debate is thus a point of strength of his writings. The subject matter appears in 
full clarity exactly because of the well-structured and increasingly subtler objections and counter-
objections. Hence, to render full justice to Jayanta’s point of view, it is important to present the 
complete debate on a given issue.8 The present attempt is to transmit the flavour of the debate found 
in the NM as exhaustively as possible.9  
Furthermore, Jayanta tends to mirror, in his syntheses, the concatenation of the points raised by 
the staged opponents in the antitheses, so the philosophical import of a full section is significantly 
influenced by the very position of its various subsections, which will thus be presented in Jayanta’s 
own sequence.  
As mentioned above, in this paper the terms śabda and artha are not translated. The latter term, 
particularly, requires some explanation, since Jayanta is known for its peculiar views about it.  
 
2.2. Bhaṭṭa Jayanta on the artha of words 
In tune with the realist, empiricist approach of mainstream Nyāya, Jayanta tends to assume the 
external reality of objects of knowledge,10 which is true also for objects known by verbal testimony. 
Such denoted objects, according to Nyāyasūtra 2.2.66, (NBhTha 132), vyaktyākṛtijātayas tu padārthaḥ, 
can be individuals, shapes, or universals. Referring to this sūtra, Jayanta asks (NMVa, II 47, 5-6): 
evaṃ siddhe bāhye ’rthe […] adhunā 
vivicyate11 gośabdaḥ kim ākṛter vācakaḥ 
Having thus established the external 
artha […], now the word “cow” is going 
                                                             
 
7 In Wesen der Frage liegt, daß sie einen Sinn hat. Sinn aber is Richtungssinn. Der Sinn der Frage is mithin die Richtung, in der die Antwort 
allein erfolgen kann, wenn sie sinnvolle, sinngemäße Antwort sein will. Mit der Frage wird das Befragte in eine bestimmte Hinsicht 
gerückt.  
8 In this sense Kei Kataoka has set the benchmark of NM studies, by his editions, translations and studies of thematic sec-
tions of the NM, each inclusive of all the objections and counter-objections.  
9 The text of NMVa has been checked and occasionally emended with the variants found in P and K, as well as GBhSha, ac-
cording to the editorial principles explained in Graheli (2012) and Graheli (2015, chapter 5). A summary of the passage exa-
mined in this paper can be found in Potter (1977: 365).  
10 See also NMVa, II 540, 16, where Jayanta distinguishes the teleological from the ontological use of the word (arthaḥ ar-
thyamānaḥ ucyate, na vasturūpa eva, abhāvasyāpi prayojanatvasaṃbhavāt /) 
11 vivicyate] vicāryate NMVa  
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uta vyakteḥ atha jāter iti.  to be examined. Is it the signifier of the 
shape, of the individual, or of the 
universal? 
 
Before Jayanta, the topic of this sūtra had been an object of dispute among Buddhists, 
Mım̄āṃsakas and Naiyāyikas. Diṅnāga rejected the theory that common nouns refer to universals and 
saw usages in apposition (sāmānādhikaraṇya) as a problem in this theory: “If the word ‘sat’ denotes the 
universal sattā, then it would not be co-referential with the words denoting particulars, such as 
‘dravya’, etc., and there would not be such expressions as ‘sad dravyam’, ‘saṅ guṇaḥ’ and the like” 
(Hattori 1996, 387).  
Diṅnāga also mentioned with disapproval the notion that the artha of words is a tadvat, the 
“possessor of that”: “[A jāti-śabda is not [a denoter] of a [particular] possessing that [universal] (tadvat 
= jātimat), because [it is] not independent [in denoting that object].12  
The concept of tadvat as the artha of words is already introduced by Uddyotakāra in the 
Nyāyavārttika, though it is often associated to Jayanta and the NM, where it is discussed in depth. 
Merits and flaws of this theory have been discussed in Ganeri 1996 and Ganeri (1999, § 4.1, 4.2). Since 
for the purpose of the present paper it is important to understand Jayanta’s position as clearly as 
possible, the relevant passages of the NM will be again presented and discussed here.  
The tadvat, the ‘possessor-of-that’, would be the artha of common nouns denoting substances, 
such as “cow” — i. e., excluding nouns denoting unique individuals without extension, such as ākāśa 
(“ether”), which do not have a correspective universal (NMVa, II 59,4-60, 7): 
anyeṣu tu prayogeṣu gāṃ dehıt̄y13 
evamādiṣu / tadvato ’rthakriyāyogāt 
tasyaivāhuḥ padārthatām // padaṃ 
tadvantam14 evārtham 
āñjasyenābhijalpati15 / na ca vyavahitā 
buddhir na ca bhārasya gauravam // 
sāmānādhikaraṇyādivyavahāraś ca16 
In other usages, such as [the 
injunction] “donate a cow!”, they said 
that the artha of a word is the 
“possessor-of-that” (tadvat), because of 
pragmatic reasons (arthakriyāyogāt). 
The word directly expresses 
(āñjasyenābhijalpati) the artha, i. e., the 
                                                             
 
12 Tr. Hattori 2000, 142. The Sanskrit version of the Pramāṇasamuccaya passage has been reconstructed in Muni Jambuvijaya 
1976, 607, as tadvato nāsvatantratvād upacārād asambhavāt / bhinnatvād buddhirūpasya rājñi bhṛtyopacāravat. It is also quoted in 
GBhSha, 137–138, albeit with vṛttirūpasya bhinnatvād in c.  
13 dehıt̄y] dogdhıt̄y K 
14 padaṃ tadvantam] padatadvantam P 
15 -bhijalpati] -bhijalpanti P 
16 ca] pi NMVa  
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mukhyayā / vṛttyopapadyamānaḥ17 san 
nānyathā yojayiṣyate // tasmāt tadvānn 
eva padārthaḥ18 // 
“possessor-of-that”,19 without 
interruptions in the cognitive process 
or anti-economical assumptions.20 The 
practical usage, for instance in cases of 
apposition (sāmānādhikaraṇya), can be 
explained by direct signification, and 
not otherwise. Therefore only the 
“possessor-of-that” is the artha of the 
word.  
 
Ganeri renders Jayanta’s views on the tadvat as follows, translating NMShu, 295: 
‘Tadvān’ literally means ‘this has that’ (tad asyāsti), so what is meant is that a particular is 
the owner of a property. But if it is the particular which is the designatum, then the 
infinity and discrepancy faults recur, [especially] since the property is not [considered by 
you to be] an undesignated indicator (upalakṣaṇa). And if both [particular and property] 
are designated, then the word has an excessive [semantic] burden (Ganeri 1999: 103). 
  
It may help to have a closer look to the text of the NM (NMVa II 59,13-16), which can also be 
translated as follows:21 
nanu ko ’yaṃ tadvān nāma.  
tad asyāstıt̄i tadvān iti viśeṣa eva 
sāmānyavān ucyate. viśeṣavācyatve 
cānantyavyabhicārau tadavasthau. 
sāmāṇyaṃ tu śabdenānucyamānaṃ 
nopalakṣaṇaṃ22 bhavati. ubhayābhidhāne 
ca śabdasyātibhāra ity uktam.  
[Objection:] What exactly is this 
“possessor-of-that”? 
[Reply:] “Possessor-of-that”, literally 
“this has that”, is exactly a particular 
(viśeṣa) which possesses the universal 
(sāmānya). If the [mere] particular 
(viśeṣa) is assumed to be expressed, 
fallacies of endlessness and ambiguity 
ensue. And the universal (sāmānya), 
                                                             
 
17 vṛttyopapadyamānaḥ] vṛttyopapādyamānaḥ NMVa  
18 padārthaḥ] śabdārthā K 
19 In the P reading, “they unhesitantly assert that the artha is exactly the ‘possessor-of-that’, i. e., of the word”.  
20 The “interruption in the cognitive process” refers to objections about a possible overlapping of cognitive processes such 
as perception, mnemonic dispositions, memory, and prior knowledge of the relation among words and artha-s. The “anti-
economical assumptions” are theories which involve the postulation of multiple unseen forces, such as the theory of the 
sphoṭa, in the view of Jayanta and the Mīmāṃsakas. Such problems are discussed in NM 6. 1.  
21 Ganeri's text of reference is NMShu. In this paper, however, the more reliable text of NMVa is adopted and, wherever ne-
cessary, emended on the basis of the two best manuscripts, P and K. 
22 nopalakṣaṇaṃ] nopalakṣyamāṇaṃ NMShu NMVa  
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which is not expressed by a word, 
cannot be an accidental characteristic 
(upalakṣaṇa)23 [of a particular]. And in 
the hypothesis that both [particular 
and universal] are designated [by a 
same word], there is an excessive 
burden on the word.  
 
If common nouns such as “cow” are taken to designate particulars, indeed, major issues arise. By 
“endlessness” (ānantya) it is meant that, since potentially there are endless referents of a common 
noun, it is absurd to claim that it designates an individual thing. The “ambiguity” (vyabhicāra) is that 
a common noun may then refer to heterogeneous entities such as substances, qualities, etc., as in the 
case of the word sat (“existent”, “real thing”), which may refer to a quality as well as to a substance 
(Hattori 1996, 337; 2000, 141).  
A problem in Ganeri’s interpretation of the passage is his use of the equivalent “property” for 
sāmānya. In the present context the Sanskrit term is clearly used, as a synonym of jāti, “universal”. 
While Ganeri’s use may suit the flow of his argumentation, it does not reflect the status of the 
universals in Jayanta’s ontology.  
Ganeri further explains Jayanta’s position as follows, translating NMShu, 296: 
[Jayanta replies]: What is meant is this. The ‘property-possessor’ (tadvān) is not a 
particular individual, such as Śābaleya, which is indicated by the word ‘this’ [in ‘this has 
that’], and it is not the collection of all the individual [cows, say] in the world. It is the 
substratum of a universal. The aforementioned particular Śābaleya is said to be the 
‘tadvān’ because it is the substratum of the universal [cowhood], and so neither infinity 
nor discrepancy are relevant [objections]. Nor do we admit that a word designates the 
qualificant [i.e. the particular] without designating the qualifier [i.e. the property]. Since 
[someone who understands the word] knows a relation [between it] and a property-
substratum, [the word] just means a tadvān. So where is the word’s excessive [semantic] 
burden? (Ganeri 1999, 103).  
 
An alternative translation, and an improved NM text, run as follows (NMVa, II 63,14-64, 6): 
ucyate. nedantānirdiśyamānaḥ 
śābaleyādiviśeṣas tadvān, na ca sarvas 
[Jayanta’s synthesis:] We say: the 
“possessor-of-that” is not a particular 
                                                             
 
23 According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, a universal inheres in a particular, it is not an accidental aspect of a particular.  
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trailokyavartı ̄vyaktivrātas tadvān. kintu 
sāmānyāśrayaḥ24 kaścid 
anullikhitaśābaleyādiviśeṣaḥ tadvān ity 
ucyate. sāṃāṇyāśrayatvān25 
nānantyavyabhicārayos tatrāvasaraḥ. na 
ca viśeṣaṇam abhidhāya26 viśeṣyam 
abhivadati27 śabda ity upagacchāmaḥ,28 
yenainam atibhāreṇa pıḍ̄ayema.29 
sāmānyāśrayamātre saṅketagrahaṇāt 
tāvanmātraṃ vadataḥ śabdasya ko30 
’tibhāraḥ. evaṃ ca31 tadvato32 
nāsvatantratvād ityādidūṣaṇaṃ 
parihṛtaṃ bhavati.  
such as Śābaleya indicated by an 
ostensive individuation (idantā). Nor 
is the “possessor-of-that” the 
collection of all the individuals of the 
world. Rather, it is called “possessor-
of-that” any unspecified (anullikhita) 
particular, such as Śābaleya, which is 
the substratum of a universal. Since it 
is the substratum of a universal, there 
is no scope for endlessness and 
ambiguity. And we do not endorse the 
idea that śabda designates an attribute 
and then it conveys the possessor of 
the attribute, so that we would cause 
the problem of overburdening this 
[śabda]. Since the conventional 
relation [between word and artha] is 
grasped exclusively in relation to this 
substratum of the universal, what 
would be the excessive burden of a 
śabda that expresses that from the 
very beginning? In this way, 
objections such as tadvato 
nāsvatantratvād are refuted.  
 
The tadvat, in Jayanta’s system, seems to have an external reality, rather than being a mental 
construct. The individual (e.g., ‘cow’) is the substratum of the correspective universal (e.g., 
‘cowness’). This individual-qualified-by-universal (e.g., cow-qualified-by-cowness), or possessor-of-
                                                             
 
24 sāmānyāśrayaḥ […] pıḍ̄ayema] om. K 
25 sāṃāṇyāśrayatvān] sāṃāṇyāśrayatvāc ca NMShu NMVa  
26 abhidhāya] anabhidhāya NMVa  
27 abhivadati] abhidadhāti NMShu NMVa  
28 upagacchāmaḥ] abhyupagacchāmaḥ NMShu NMVa  
29 pıḍ̄ayema] pıḍ̄ayemahi NMShu NMVa  
30 ko] kataro NMShu  
31 ca] om. NMShu NMVa  
32 tadvato] tadvator NMShu  
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that, is the artha designated by a common noun (e.g., “cow”). In this way the objections of endlessness 
and ambiguity, caused by particularism, are neutralized. Since the very thing ontologically is an 
individual qualified by a universal, the operation occurs at once, by direct designation, and not in two 
separate instants, so also the charge of semantic burden does not stand anymore.  
Jayanta seems to accept some degree of flexibility in the application of the tadvat concept, 
according to the context, in terms of the predominance of the particular, of the universal and the 
shape in given circumstances. This would also somewhat explain the formulation in Nyāyasūtra 2.2.66. 
If this is the case, for Jayanta tadvat is not necessary synonym of jātimat, though it may be its most 
frequent application, because it can also be ākṛtimat: 
tuśabdo viśeṣaṇārthaḥ. kiṃ viśeṣyate. 
guṇapradhānabhāvasyāniyamena 
śabdārthatvam. sthite ’pi tadvato 
vācyatve kvacit prayoge jāteḥ 
prādhānyaṃ vyakter aṅgabhāvaḥ yathā 
gaur na padā spraṣṭavyā iti sarvagavıṣ̄u 
pratiṣedho ’vagamyate. kvacid vyakteḥ 
prādhānyaṃ jāter aṅgabhāvaḥ yathā 
gāṃ muṃca gāṃ badhāna iti niyatāṃ 
kāṃcid vyaktim uddiśya prayujyate. 
kvacid ākṛteḥ prādhānyaṃ vyakter 
aṅgabhāvaḥ jātis tu33 nāsty eva yathā 
piṣṭamayyo gāvaḥ kriyantām iti.  
In the Nyāyasūtra, the word tu 
indicates a specification. What is 
specified? That the property of being 
the artha of a śabda implies, 
unrestrictedly, a primary-secondary 
relation. [To explain:] Once 
established that what is expressed is 
the possessor-of-that (tadvat), (1) in 
same cases the universal is primary 
and the individual secondary, as in 
the injunction “a cow should not be 
touched with one's feet”. (2) in 
others, the individual is primary and 
the universal is secondary, as in 
“release this cow”, “tie this cow” […] 
(3) and in others, again, the shape is 
primary and the individual is 
secondary, while the universal is not 
there at all, as in “cows made of flour 
should be modelled” […].  
 
Ganeri (1999: 104-105) thinks that Jayanta’s tadvat theory is logically flawed, because he “clearly 
cannot take ‘property-possessor’, the direct object in his meaning specification, as standing for a 
certain particular”, and because “if this phrase is mentioned”, it becomes tautological, because “the 
meaning clause becomes a mere restatement of the fact that ‘A-hood-possessor’ (A-tvavān) and ‘A’ are 
                                                             
 
33 tu] om. NMVa  
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synonyms, which is a consequence of the fact that the abstraction and possession affixes are inverses 
of one another”.34 
An issue in Ganeri’s interpretation seems to be whether it is legitimate to assume that the tat in 
tadvat is meant as a “property”, i.e., as the dharma in the Nyāya theory of inference. If Jayanta 
believed in the ontological, external existence of particulars-qualified-by-universals, in his system a 
particular cannot but be a universal-possessor. The distinction between a tadvat and a dharmin, 
discussed in § 5.1 below, may help to draw the distinction between sāmānya and dharma: while the 
former is a universal, a dharma, at least in the context of inference, does not need to be so.35 
Lastly, in the economy of this paper, it is important to stress that the tadvat concerns the artha of 
words, not that of sentences, as it will be explained below.36  
 
2.3. About inference 
In the following discussion on the reduction of śabda to inference, Jayanta analyzes formal aspects of 
possible versions of the inference from words to their objects. Since it is important to precisely 
present such inferential structures, a brief clarification on the simplified presentation of inferences 
adopted in this paper is in order. The formalization originally proposed by Schayer 2001, 106 and 
clarified by Ganeri 2001, 16 has been here adopted and simplified. The attempt is to render the gist of 
the Nyāya theory of inference as known at Jayanta’s time, that is, without taking into consideration 
the developments of Navyanyāya. 37  Using Schayer’s formalization, the complete smoke-fire 
argument, the stock example of inference in Nyāya, would run thus: 
 
 
 
                                                             
 
34 Here Ganeri seems to invoke the taddvatvam tad eva rule of inference, which is an expression of x + vat + tva = x + tva + vat = 
x, because “the abstraction operator ‘-ness’ and the concretization operator ‘-possessing’ denote inverse operations” 
(Bhattacharyya 2001, 175; see also Matilal 2001, 212–213).  
35 As discussed next, in § 2.3.  
36 On Jayanta and his theory of sentence signification, see Graheli 2016 and Freschi and Keidan forthcoming.  
37 Thus some improvements in the formalization of Nyāya inferences, found in Bhattacharyya 2001 and Matilal 2001, have 
been here ignored. The central role of paramārśa, as described in Bhattacharyya 2001, 178, and on pervasion (vyāpti) (Bhatta-
charyya 2001, 178; Matilal 2001, 206), come to mind. For Jayanta’s discussion of inference theory, see NMVa, I 311, 8–11, 375, 
3–4, and II 582, 15–23.  
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(1)  ayaṃ parvato vahnimān  This hill possesses fire  Sp  
(2)  dhūmavattvāt  Because it possesses smoke  Hp  
(3)  yo yo dhūmavān,  
 sa sa vahnimān  
For every x, if x possesses  
smoke, then x possesses fire  
(x)(Hx ⊃ Sx)  
(4)  tathā cāyam  This mountain possesses smoke  Hp  
(5)  tasmāt tathā  Therefore this mountain possesses fire  ∴ Sp  
 
The (1) (pratijñā) can be subsumed in (5) (nigamana), and (2) (hetu) in (4) (upanaya), so that it is 
easier to focus on the modus ponens, implicit in the inference:  
(x)(Hx  ⊃ Sx) If x possesses smoke, x possesses fire 
Hp  This hill possesses smoke 
∴ Sp  This hill possesses fire 
 
That this is a formally valid inference is proven as follows:  
1.  (x)(Hx ⊃ Sx)  
2.  Hp 
∴ Sp 
3. Hp ⊃ Sp  1, Universal Instantation 
4. Sp  3, 2, Modus Ponens 
 
The relation of “possession” between terms has the technical sense of a “occurrence-exacting” 
relation (vṛttiniyamaka), i.e., it specifies the ontological presence of a property (dharma) on or in 
another thing, this thing being the possessor (pakṣa) of the property. “Property”, again, does not need 
to be a quality as the English term suggests, and indeed in many Nyāya inferences it is a substance:38 
Navya-Nyāya logicians define the term ‘property’ (dharma) as the second member 
(pratiyogin) of occurrence-exacting relations which alone are to be denoted by the 
technical term ‘possess’ used in inferences. Thus the table possesses the book when the 
book is on the table, and the book is the property of the table (Bhattacharyya 2001, 174).  
 
For simplicity’s sake, however, I will use the term “property” to render dharma in inferential 
contexts and I will keep track of inferential arguments by means of a simple representation of the 
                                                             
 
38 Matilal (2001, 209) proposes a relation of “location” of a “locus” and “locatee” as a solution of the ambiguity generated by 
the use of the term “property”.  
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modus ponens. The purpose is to precisely identify the main components of each inferential argument 
—namely the probandum (sādhya), the locus (pakṣa) and the probans (sādhana, liṅga, or hetu)— and to 
keep track of the relation of concomitance between probans and probandum:  
If something possesses smoke, then it possesses fire 
This hill possesses smoke 
Therefore this hill possesses fire 
 
3. Thesis: śabda is an autonomous instrument of knowledge 
Jayanta’s discussion of śabda starts with its definition found in the roots of his tradition Nyāyasūtra 
1.1.7: “śabda is the instruction of an authoritative source” (āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ). This definition is 
expected to flawlessly and unambiguously justify the inclusion of śabda in the list of the four 
instruments of knowledge (pramāṇā-s) accepted in the Nyāyasūtra: perception, inference, analogy, and 
śabda.  
Since there are also forms of pseudo-śabda that are not epistemically productive, Jayanta (NMVa, 
I 396,6-12) suggests that the expression “instrument to realize something” (sādhyasādhana) should be 
supplied from sūtra 1.1.6 (akārake śabdamātre prāmāṇyaprasaktir iti tadvinivṛttaye pūrvasūtrāt 
sādhyasādhanapadam ākṛṣyate). Moreover, the words “knowledge” (jñāna), artha, “certain” 
(vyavasāyātmika),39 and “undeviating” (avyabhicārin) should be supplied from Nyāyasūtra 1.1.5, in order 
to exclude from the definition invalid cognitions such as recollections, doubts and errors 
(jñānapadasya smṛtijanakasya vyavacchedāya cārthagrahaṇasya saṃśayaviparyayajanakanirākaraṇāya ca 
vyavasāyātmakāvyabhicāripadayor anuvṛttiḥ). 40  The full definition would thus read: “śabda is the 
instruction of an authoritative source and is an instrument to achieve undeviating and certain 
knowledge of the artha” (avyabhicārādiviśeṣaṇārthapratıt̄ijanaka upadeśaḥ śabda ity uktaṃ bhavati).  
Jayanta also reports an alternative interpretation of the sūtra, according to which the possibility 
of confusing cases of doubts and errors is already excluded by the presence of the words 
“instruction” and “authoritative source”, in which case there is no need to supply words from 
previous sūtra-s.  
                                                             
 
39 Potter (1977, 167) renders it as “well-defined”. Although in other contexts vyavasāya indicates apperception or introspec-
tion (e. g., see NK, s. v.), in this context, at least in the interpretation of the sūtra found in the Nyāyabhāṣya and in the NM, the 
introspective element does not seem predominant.  
40 Here Jayanta applies the technique of integrating elliptical aphorisms with words used in previous aphorisms, a technique 
called anuvṛtti and most famously used in Pāṇini’s grammar.  
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In either way, it is clear that śabda is understood as enjoying the same epistemological status of 
perception, inference and analogy, since it can generate true knowledge of the artha.  
The word “instruction” (upadeśa) in 1.1.7 is glossed by Jayanta (NMVa, I 398,2-3) as “act of 
designation” (abhidhānakriyā). This gloss is further specified (NMVa, I 399, 2), as “an act of designation 
which produces knowledge of its artha caused by the perception of an audible entity” 
(śrotragrāhyavastukaraṇikā tadarthapratıt̄ir abhidhānakriyā).  
A common feature of perception, inference, analogy and śabda is that the knowledge produced 
by them also involves the knower’s awareness that he is knowing something. Jayanta justifies the 
distinction among perception, inference and śabda on the basis of the instrumental cause used to 
obtain them, i.e. sense-organs, inferential marks, and an audible instruction, respectively, and on the 
basis of the different terminology commonly used to denote these distinct epistemic acts (NMVa, I 
399,12-13). Here Jayanta argues that śabda may have other applications, for instance as an inferential 
mark to prove the existence of ether (ākāśa),41 which however do not disprove its distinct epistemic 
role in verbal testimony: 
nanu pratıt̄eḥ saṃvidātmakatvāt 
nābhidhānakriyā nāma kācid apūrvā 
saṃvid anyā vidyate. tatkaraṇasya 
copadeśatāyām atiprasaṅga ity uktam.  
satyam, saṃvidātmaiva sarvatra pratıt̄iḥ. 
sā cakṣurādikaraṇikā pratyakṣaphalam 
liṅgakaraṇikā ’numānaphalam 
śrotragrāhyakaraṇikā śabdaphalam. na hi 
dṛśyate anumıȳate abhidhıȳata iti 
paryāyaśabdāḥ. tatpratıt̄iviśeṣajanane ca 
śabdasyopadeśatvam ucyate. 
ākāśānumānavivakṣādau tu tasya 
liṅgatvam eveti.  
[Objection] A cognition is constituted 
of awareness (saṃvit),42 therefore there 
is no [need of] such a new awareness 
called “act of designation”. And there 
is a fallacy of over-application when 
one says that its instrument [i.e., śabda] 
has the nature of instruction.  
[Reply] True, a cognition is invariably 
made of awareness, but it is still the 
outcome of perception when caused by 
the senses, of inference when caused 
by an inferential mark, of verbal 
testimony when it is caused by what is 
grasped by the hearing organ. In fact, 
“perceived”, “inferred”, and “denoted” 
are not synonyms. One says that 
[śabda] has the character of instruction 
when there is the production of a 
                                                             
 
41 See VD, 308, where the inference is explained tatra śabdaḥ […] na sparśavad viśeṣaguṇaḥ. bāhyendriyapratyakṣād […] nātma-
guṇaḥ. śrotragrāhyatvād viśeṣaguṇabhāvāc ca na dikkālamanasām. pāriśeṣyād guṇo bhūtvā ākāśasyādhigame liṅgam. Incidentally, in 
the Nyāyakalikā (Kataoka 2013, 20, 5–6), Jayanta shows an argument to infer that śabda is a quality as an example of pa-
riśeṣānumāna.  
42 Cf. GBhSha, 213, 27: samyag vettıt̄i saṃvit.  
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specific cognition. In other 
applications [of śabda] such as the 
inference of ether, however, one 
specifically refers to its character of 
inferential mark.  
 
The idea that any conceptual knowledge is necessarily linguistic, regardless of its derivation 
from perception or inference, is debated and refuted by Jayanta from the viewpoints of several Nyāya 
authorities in NMVa, I 209-225 (NM 2), and from his own perspective in NMVa, II 476-485, where he 
maintains that the theory that every cognition is linguistic is a consequence of the erroneous 
assumption of a metaphysical unity of śabda and of a misguided denial of the reality of differences. 
This happens because language is used to describe any kind of knowledge: 
kas tvayā dṛṣṭo ’rthaḥ iti pṛṣṭo vakti gaur 
iti. kıd̄ṛśaṃ te jñānam utpannam gaur iti. 
kaṃ43 śabdaṃ prayuktavān44 gaur iti. tata 
eṣā bhrantiḥ. vastutas tu viviktā evaite 
śabdajñānārthāḥ (NMVa, II 480,12-15).  
When asked “what artha did you see?”, 
one may answer “Cow”. And, “which 
type of knowledge did you get?” 
“Cow”. And “which śabda did you use?” 
“Cow”. This error [of thinking that 
there are no differences] is caused by 
such usages. But actually these śabda, 
knowledge and artha are distinct 
entities.  
 
An authoritative source is characterized in NBhTha ad 1.1.7 as “an instructor who (1) has directly 
experienced the true essence of the artha and (2) is moved by the desire to describe it as it is or it is 
not” (āptaḥ khalu sākṣātkṛtadharmā yathādṛṣṭasyārthasya cikhyāpayiṣayā prayukta upadeṣṭā sākṣātkaraṇam 
arthasyāptiḥ tayā pravartata ity āptaḥ). Jayanta (NMVa, I 399,12-13) enlarges the scope of (1), by writing 
that there is no restriction to things directly perceived by the instructor, because the 
authoritativeness is not undermined if the true nature of the artha is ascertained by the instructor 
through inference, etc. (na tu pratyakṣeṇaiva grahaṇam iti niyamaḥ, anumānādiniścitārthopadeśino ’py 
āptatvānapāyāt). Here the ādi of anumānādi suggests even the possibility of a chain of śabda-s.  
If these two criteria are met, the source is authoritative regardless of the social or moral status. 
Echoing NBhTha ad 1.1.7, Jayanta (NMVa, I 400, 11) writes that the authoritativeness is possible in 
                                                             
 
43 kaṃ] P K; kıd̄ṛśaṃ NMVa  
44 prayuktavān] P K; prayuktavān asi NMVa  
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seers, cultivated people and barbarians (ṛṣyāryamlecchasāmānyaṃ vaktavyaṃ cāptalakṣaṇam).45 Thus the 
authoritativeness of the source applies to both common and Vedic language. Unlike in Mım̄āṃsā, 
indeed, even the authority of the Veda is based on the reliability of their author. The foundation of 
the epistemic validity of language on a trustworthy author also implies that language is not 
considered permanent, since any instructor’s utterance must necessarily occur at some point in time; 
furthermore, it means that the relation between śabda and artha needs to be considered conventional, 
rather than natural.  
Jayanta claims, therefore, that śabda is a separate instrument of knowledge, quite distinct from 
direct perception and inferential processes.  
 
4. Antithesis: śabda is inference 
Reductionists maintain that knowledge produced by śabda is nothing but inferential knowledge 
(NMVa, I 401,9-10): 
śabdasya khalu paśyāmo nānumānād 
vibhinnatām / atas tallakṣaṇākṣepāt na 
vācyaṃ lakṣaṇāntaram // 
We do not see a distinction of śabda 
from inference. Since [the proposal of] 
its specific character stands refuted, no 
separate definition needs to be 
formulated.  
 
4.1. The Vaiśeṣika arguments 
4.1.1. Analogy of content and relation 
It is clear that both śabda and inference can convey knowledge of unperceived objects and are as such 
distinct from perception.46 Moreover, they are both based on a necessary relation,47 which is a general 
law that can be applied to any given instance and is not confined to individual cases, unlike with 
perception. A relation among particulars, indeed, would not be productive, because one would need 
                                                             
 
45 In this connection, see also Chakrabarti 1994, 103, who makes the vivid example of a thief or a murderer confessing in 
court.  
46 Cf. ŚVRa, śabda 55ab: viṣayo ’nyādṛśas tāvad dṛśyate liṅgaśabdayoḥ // 
47 Cf. ŚVRa, śabda 25: na cāpy ajñātasambandhaṃ padaṃ kiṃ cit prakāśakam / sambandhānanubhūtyāto na syād ananumānatā //  
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to know an infinite number of relationships conforming to the infinite number of particulars (NMVa, I 
401,11-14):48 
parokṣaviṣayatvaṃ hi tulyaṃ tāvad dvayor 
api / sāmānyaviṣayatvaṃ ca 
sambandhāpekṣaṇādvayoḥ // agṛhıt̄e ’pi 
sambandhe naikasyāpi pravartanam / 
sambandhaś ca viśeṣāṇām ānantyād 
atidurgamaḥ //  
To begin with, they both have an 
unperceived object, which must also be 
a generic one, since both śabda and 
inference depend on a [necessarily 
generic] relation: when the relation is 
not grasped neither śabda nor 
inference can function. A relation 
among particulars is inconceivable 
because of endlessness [of particulars 
and thus of their possible relations].  
 
This is the basic Vaiśeṣika argument, in which śabda is reduced to inference because of its 
unperceived artha and because it is grounded, like inference, on a prior knowledge of a relation 
between the sign and the signified. The argument is developed in the commentaries ad Vaiśeṣikasūtra 
9.1.3, “By this [exposition of inference] knowledge deriving from śabda has [also] been explained” 
(etena śābdaṃ vyākhyātam).49  
Therefore, since the epistemic content has the same characteristics (i.e., it is an unperceived and 
generic object), and since knowledge of the sign-signified relation is a necessary condition, śabda is 
not distinct from inference.  
Prima facie, the alleged relation of concomitance between śabda and artha can be formulated as 
follows, since the locus is not clarified: 
If x possesses śabda, x possesses artha  
 
                                                             
 
48 Cf. ŚVRa, śabda, 35–37: śabdānumānayor aikyaṃ dhūmād agnyanumānavat // anvayavyatirekābhyām ekapratyakṣadarśanāt / 
sambandhapūrvakatvāc ca pratipattir ito yataḥ // pratyakṣānyapramāṇatvāt tadadṛṣṭārthabodhanāt / sāmānyaviṣayatvāc ca trai-
kalyaviṣayāśrayāt // 
49 Praśastapāda explains it as follows (VD, Bhāṣya, 576): śabdādın̄ām apy anumāne ’ntarbhāvaḥ, samānavidhitvāt. yathā pra-
siddhasamayasyāsandigdhaliṅgadarśanaprasiddhyanusmaraṇābhyām atın̄driye ’rthe bhavaty anumānam evam śabdādibhyo ’pıt̄i. śru-
tismṛtilakṣaṇo ’py āmnāyo vaktṛprāmāṇyāpekṣaḥ, tadvacanād āmnāyaprāmāṇyam. Vyomaśiva glosses (VD, Vyomavatı ̄, 577): tathā 
śabdādeḥ kārakajātasyānumānasāmagryām antarbhāve tatphalasyāpi phale ’ntarbhāvo jñāta eva. […] samānavidhitvāt samāna-
lakṣaṇayogitvād iti […]. And Candrānanda (CVṛ, ad 9. 20): yathā kāryādismṛtisavyapekṣam anumānaṃ trikālaviṣayam 
atın̄driyārthaṃ ca tathaiva śābdaṃ saṅketasmṛtyapekṣaṃ trikālaviṣayam atın̄driyārthaṃ ca.  
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4.1.2. Analogy of sign 
Just like inference, śabda works by means of a sign which, once directly perceived, can cause 
knowledge of an object (NMVa, I 402,1-2):50  
yathā pratyakṣato dhūmaṃ dṛṣṭvāgnir 
anumıȳate / tathaiva śabdam ākarṇya 
tadartho ’py avagamyate //  
Just like fire is inferred after the 
perception of smoke, after hearing a 
śabda its object is known.  
 
Hence, insofar as the sign, there is no distinction between inference and śabda.  
 
If x possesses śabda, x possesses artha 
This x possesses śabda 
Therefore this x possesses artha  
 
4.1.3. Analogy of relation 
Moreover, śabda is grounded on a relation of agreement and difference (anvayavyatireka), just like 
inferential processes (NMVa, I 402,3-4):51  
anvayavyatirekau ca bhavato ’trāpi 
liṅgavat / yo yatra dṛśyate śabdaḥ sa 
tasyārthasya vācakaḥ // 
Agreement and difference apply also 
here, just as with an inferential sign. 
[The relation of agreement is:] The 
śabda perceived in a given [artha] 
(yatra) is the signifier of that very artha.  
 
Hence, even from the point of view of the peculiar type of relation among the sign and the 
signified, which must be known in advance, no distinction can be made. Inferences for which there 
are examples both in agreement and difference — i.e., for which both a positive example (sapakṣa) and 
a negative one (vipakṣa) can be stated — are the most common ones. The theory, then, is that the 
śabda inference is of the anvayavyatirekin sort.52 
 
                                                             
 
50 This text passage seems to be related to ŚVRa, śabda, 36b: ekapratyakṣadarśanāt.  
51 This passage seems to be related to ŚVRa, śabda, 36a: anvayavyatirekābhyām.  
52 The anvayavyatirekin inference is the one explicitly endorsed by Buddhist logicians. While there is scope to accomodated 
the kevalānvayin inference, the kevalavyatirekin one is explicitly rejected, unlike in Nyāya from Uddyotakara onwards (Matilal 
1998, 117). On the similarity with Mill’s method of agreement and difference used to build inductive reasonings, as well as 
on rendering anvaya and vyatireka in such terms, see Matilal 2001, 200.  
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If x possesses śabda, x possesses artha 
If x does not possess artha, x does not possess śabda 
 
4.1.4. Analogy of property-possessorship 
Both śabda and inference are based on knowledge of pakṣadharmatā, the possession of a property by a 
locus (NMVa, I 402,5-6):53  
pakṣadharmatvam apy asti śabda eva yato 
’rthavān / prakalpayiṣyate pakṣo dhūmo 
dahanavān iva // 
There is also [in both] the 
characteristic of being the property 
possessed by a locus, because śabda 
possesses the artha and is thus 
accepted as a locus, just like smoke 
possesses the property “fire”.  
 
The objector, here, seems to argue that the śabda epistemic process is an inference like the one 
in which fire is inferred with smoke as the locus and smoke-ness as the probans:  
If smoke possesses smoke-ness, it possesses fire 
This smoke possesses smoke-ness 
Therefore this smoke possesses fire 
 
4.1.5. Analogy of universal sign 
Furthermore, the sign is a universal, and not a particular, just like in inference (NMVa, I 402,7-8):54 
tatra dhūmatvasāmānyaṃ yathā vahati 
hetutām55 / gatvādi56 śabdasāmānyaṃ 
tadvad atrāpi vakṣyati // 
Just like there (in the fire inference) 
the universal “smoke-ness” has the 
property of being the inferential 
reason,57 so even here (in śabda) the 
universal of śabda, e.g., gatva, etc., can 
have it. 
 
                                                             
 
53 This text passage seems to be related to ŚVRa, śabda, 36c: sambandhapūrvakatvāc ca.  
54 This text passage seems to be related to ŚVRa, śabda 37b: adṛṣṭārthabodhanāt.  
55 yathā vahati hetutām] P NMVa; yathāvagatihetutaḥ K  
56 gatvādi] P K; gotvādi NMVa  
57 The tas suffix in avagatihetutaḥ may be explained by means of a metaphorical application of sūtra 5.4.48 of the Aṣṭādhyāyī, 
ṣaṣṭhyā vyāśraye.  
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The inferential sign is gatvādi, i.e., the universal of the phonemes g, au and ḥ, which is possessed 
by the locus, i.e. the word gauḥ (“cow”), and by which the artha ‘cow’ is inferred, since it is also 
possessed by the locus gauḥ:  
If śabda possesses gatvādi, then it possesses ‘cow’ 
This śabda possesses gatvādi 
Therefore this śabda possesses ‘cow’  
 
Therefore no distinction should be made, because there is an analogy insofar as the universality 
of the sign.  
The Vaiśeṣika reduction, based on the reason stated in VD, Praśastapādabhāṣya, 576, “because 
[śabda] has the same rules [as inference]” (samānavidhitvāt), is thus completed. Jayanta next mentions 
some Sāṅkhya arguments in defense of the autonomy of śabda from inference.  
 
4.2. The Sāṅkhya defense of śabda is inconclusive 
On the strength of the evidence presented above, śabda should not be considered as different from 
inference, because of their analogous epistemic content (viśaya) and formal components (sāmagrı)̄.58 
There are some minor differences between śabda and inference, but these are not decisive and do not 
require a distinct categorization. Specifically, there are three aspects that can be found in śabda but 
not in inference (NMVa, I 402,9-14): 
evaṃ viṣayasāmagrıs̄āmyād ekatvaniścaye 
/ na vilakṣaṇatāmātraṃ kiñcid 
anyatvakāraṇam // 
pūrvavarṇakramodbhūtasaṃskārasahakār
itā / puruṣāpekṣavṛttitvaṃ 
vivakṣānusṛti59kramaḥ // ityādinā viśeṣeṇa 
na pramāṇāntaraṃ bhavet / 
kāryakāraṇadharmādiviśeṣo ’trāpi nāsti 
kim //  
In this way, since the unity has been 
ascertained due to a similarity of 
epistemic content and formal 
components (sāmagrı)̄, a discrepancy of 
characters by itself should not be a 
reason for otherness. The peculiarities 
[of śabda] are (1) the assistence of 
mental dispositions (saṃskāra), 
generated by [the perception of] past 
phonemes uttered in sequence, (2) the 
requirement of a person [in the form of 
the speaker], (3) a sequence of sounds 
conforming to the intention [of the 
                                                             
 
58 On the use of the term sāmagrı,̄ cf. VD, Vyomavatı ̄, 577: tathā śabdādeḥ kārakajātasyānumānasāmagryām antarbhāve tatpha-
lasyāpi phale ’ntarbhāvo jñāta eva.  
59 -sṛti] P NMVa; smṛtiḥ K 
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speaker]. By means of such specificities 
śabda ought not to be considered a 
separate instrument of knowledge, 
because there is nothing special in its 
effect, cause, property, etc.  
 
These three requirements correspond to the arguments listed in the Ślokavārttika as inconclusive 
reasons for the independency of śabda, at least in part attributed to Sāṅkhya sources and not 
considered by Kumārila a valid defense of the autonomy of śabda.60  
The two reasons are not effective to prove a distinction. In the first reason, although the role of 
mental dispositions and phonemes is indeed a peculiarity of śabda, this concerns the psychological 
acquisition of linguistic sounds, not the acquisition of knowledge of the artha. As for the second 
reason, although the speaker’s intention to designate something is indeed a necessary condition and 
might be considered a distinction from inferential processes, it is not an exclusive character of śabda, 
since it is observed also in non-verbal situations. As such, it cannot be used as a peculiar 
characteristic of śabda (NMVa, I 402,15-17):61 
yatheṣṭaviniyojyatvam api 
nānyatvakāraṇam / hastasaṃjñādiliṅge ’pi 
tathābhāvasya darśanāt // 
Even the application according to an 
intention is not a cause for otherness, 
because an intention is observed also 
in the cases of ostensive indications by 
hand, gesture, etc. [which are not 
verbalized and thus they are no 
instances of śabda]. 
 
One may argue that while in inferences a clear awareness of the relation and of an illustration is 
necessary, this does not happen in verbal knowledge. This apparent dissimilarity, however, relates to 
the peculiarities of unfamiliar and familiar objects of knowledge: in the former case an illustration 
                                                             
 
60 Cf. ŚVRa, śabda 15cd–17: bhedaḥ sāṅkhyādibhis tv iṣṭo na tūktaṃ bhedakāraṇam // pūrvasaṃskārayuktāntyavarṇavākyādikalpanā 
/ vivakṣādi ca dhūmādau nāstıt̄y etena bhinnatā // yair uktā tatra vaidharmyavikalpasamajātitā / dhūmānityaviṣāṇyādiviśeṣān na hi 
bhinnatā // 
61 Cf. ŚVRa, śabda 19–20: yatheṣṭaviniyogena pratıt̄ir yāpi śabdataḥ / na dhūmāder itıh̄āpi vyabhicāro ’ṅgavṛttibhiḥ // hasta-
saṃjñādayo ye ’pi yadarthapratipādane / bhaveyuḥ kṛtasaṅketās te talliṅgam iti sthitiḥ // 
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and a relation must be explicitly stated, while in the latter one the process is automated and the 
illustration does not need to be recollected (NMVa, I 403,1-2):62 
dṛṣṭāntanirapekṣatvam abhyaste viṣaye 
samam / anabhyaste tu 
sambandhasmṛtisāpekṣatā dvayoḥ // 
Inference and śabda are analogous also 
because in cases of a frequently 
recurring object a specific illustration 
(dṛṣṭānta) [which corroborates the 
relation] is not anymore required, 
while when the object is not recurrent, 
they both require the recollection of 
the relation [corroborated by a specific 
illustration].  
 
Furthermore, one may consider the existence of polysemous expressions as a reason to see śabda 
as an independent instrument of knowledge, but the ambiguity generated by such expressions occurs 
also in the epistemic results of perception and inference (NMVa, I 403,3-6):63 
anekapratibhodbhūti64hetutvam api 
dṛśyate65 / aspaṣṭaliṅge kasmiṃścid aśva 
ityādiśabdavat // sphuṭārthānavasāyāc 
ca66 pramāṇābhāsato yathā / liṅge tathaiva 
śabde ’pi nānārthabhramakāriṇi // 
When the inferential sign is unclear 
multiple impressions can be generated, 
like [multiple meanings can be 
generated] by the word aśva. And just 
like in the case of an inferential sign 
there can be no determination of a 
distinct artha due to a faulty 
instrument of knowledge 
(pramāṇābhāsa), so [it can happen] in 
the case of a śabda producing the 
erroneus knowledge of multiple artha-s.  
 
Here Jayanta exemplifies polysemy by means of the word aśva, which can mean both “horse” 
and “you grow” (see GBhSha, 71). He also uses the term “pseudo-instrument of knowledge” 
(pramāṇābhāsa), as done elsewhere in the NM (NMVa, II 630, 3), where he explains that a genuine 
instrument of knowledge cannot be falsified (bādhyabādhakabhāvānupapatteḥ), and that when a 
                                                             
 
62 Cf. ŚVRa, śabda 33–34: dṛṣṭāntānabhidhānaṃ ca dhūmādau vyabhicāritam / prasiddhatvād dhi tatrāpi na dṛṣṭānto ’bhidhıȳate // 
anabhyaste tv apekṣante śabde sambandhinaḥ smṛtim / atra prayukta ity evaṃ budhyate hi cirāt kvacit // 
63 Cf. ŚVRa, śabda 24cd, na cehāśvādiśabdebhyo bhedas teṣāṃ pratıȳate, as well as ŚVRa, śabda 32, yas tv anirdhāritārthanām 
anekapratibhodbhavaḥ / sa liṅge ’py asphuṭe dṛṣṭas tasmān naitena bhidyate // 
64 pratibhodbhūti] P K; pratibhotpatti NMVa  
65 dṛśyate] P K; vadyate NMVa  
66 navasāyāc ca] P K; navasāyāś ca NMVa  
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falsification occurs it is because a pseudo-instrument of knowledge was used. This principle may be 
applied to any instrument of knowledge, be it perception, inference, or śabda.  
 
4.3. The Buddhist arguments 
4.3.1. The universal of trustworthiness 
Even when śabda generates only an impression the epistemic value of the deriving knowledge is 
guaranteed by the authoritativeness of the statement. According to an often quoted passage 
originally ascribed to Diṅnāga, śabda-derived knowledge can be explained as an inference based on 
the universal “authoritativeness” as the inferential sign (NMVa, I 403,7-11):67 
api ca pratibhāmātre śabdāj jāte ’pi 
kutracit / āptavādatvaliṅgena janyate68 
niścitā matiḥ // ata eva hi manyante 
śabdasyāpi vipaścitaḥ / 
āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyād anumānatā // 
Moreover, in some cases even if by 
śabda itself only an impression is 
produced, a certain knowledge can be 
generated by means of the inferential 
sign of authoritativeness. Therefore 
learned people think that śabda has the 
character of inference because of the 
undisputedness of a trustworthy 
statement.  
 
This seems to suggest, again, a separation between comprehension, or a vague impression of the 
artha generated by śabda, and knowledge, which is actually produced by an inference from the 
inferential sign “authoritativeness of the statement”.  
The passage āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyād may also be interpreted as “because of the 
undisputedness common to (sāmānya) authoritative statements (āptavāda) [and inference]”, though 
this may not be what Jayanta has in mind here, if the interpretation of Cakradhara reflects his 
intention. In the GBhSha, 72, indeed, there are two alternative interpretations of the argument: 
āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyād iti yathā 
dhūmasāmānyād agnisāmānyaniścaya 
evam āptavādasāmānyād 
Just like from the universal of smoke 
the universal of fire is ascertained, so 
from the universal of an authoritative 
                                                             
 
67 The argument is found in the Pramāṇavārttika, svārthānumāna, 216ab; Taber (1996: 22) also quotes the Tātparyaṭīkā ad 
Nyāyasūtra 1.1.7 (Thakur 1996), “The theory probably originated with Diṅnāga; Vācaspati attributes it to him”. Vācaspati in-
troduces the argument with yathoktaṃ bhadantena. See also āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyād anumānatā (ŚVRa, śabda 23cd).  
68 janyate] P NMVa; jayate K 
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avisaṃvādāditvasāmānyaniścaya ity 
arthaḥ. āptavādānāṃ vāvisaṃvādaḥ 
sāmānyaṃ rūpam, yo ya āptavādaḥ sa so 
’visaṃvādıt̄y arthaḥ.  
statement the universal of 
undisputedness is ascertained. 
Alternatively, the undisputedness of 
authoritative statements is the same 
[as that of inferences]: whatever is 
authoritative, is undisputed.  
 
In the first interpretation the term sāmānyam denotes a universal, while in the second it 
indicates the similarity of śabda and inference. The first interpretation can be expressed as follows, 
perhaps with the artha as a locus, though this is not clarified in the GBh: 
If an artha possesses authoritative-statement-ness, then it possesses undisputedness 
This artha possesses authoritative-statement-ness 
Therefore this artha possesses undisputedness 
 
In the second śabda may be the locus: 
If a śabda possesses authoritativeness, then it possesses undisputedness 
This śabda possesses authoritativeness 
Therefore this śabda possesses undisputedness  
 
4.3.2. The inference of the speaker’s intention 
Going back to the notion of śabda as a locus that possesses an external object, this does not make 
sense, because there cannot be a relation of possessorship between an ephemeral śabda and a stable 
object. A better reductionist formulation is to say that the probandum of the śabda inference is the 
speaker’s intended signification, rather than the artha (NMVa, I 404,1-2):69 
kiñ ca śabdo vivakṣāyām eva prāmāṇyam 
aśnute / na bāhye vyabhicāritvāt tasyāṃ 
caitasya liṅgatā //  
Rather, śabda can have epistemic 
validity only in relation to an intention 
to speak, and not to an external object, 
because [such an inferential mark] 
would be flawed by ambiguity. The 
status of inferential sign of that (śabda) 
is only in [proving] that [intention of 
the speaker].  
 
The flaw of ambiguity is that the same śabda may refer to different things according to the 
speaker’s intention, so one necessarily needs to first determine the intention. The allegation is that a 
                                                             
 
69 Cf. ŚVRa, śabda, 39cd: [PP:] pratyayaḥ kiṃnimitto ’rthe [UP:] vaktṛbuddheḥ.  
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śabda proves nothing but the speaker’s intention, in an inference in which the locus must necessarily 
be the speaker, although this is not explicitly stated by Jayanta: 
If a speaker possesses śabda, then it possesses an intention to speak 
This speaker possesses śabda 
Therefore this speaker possesses an intention to speak 
 
5. Synthesis: śabda is not inference 
5.1. Refutation of the Vaiśeṣika arguments 
5.1.1. Disanalogy of content and relation 
Jayanta begins his rebuttal by a deconstruction of his opponent’s position (§ 4.1.1) into a dilemma 
(vikalpa): are we referring to śabda in its form of sentence or single word? The artha of a sentence 
cannot depend on a pre-established relation and thus it cannot be known by an inferential process, 
because if that were the case it would be impossible to explain the knowledge produced by newly 
composed sentences (NMVa, I 404,3-7):70 
atrābhıd̄hıȳate.71 dvividhaḥ śabdaḥ 
padātmā vākyātmākāś ca72 / tatra vākyam 
anavagatasambandham eva vākyārtham 
avabodhayitum73 alam, 
abhinavakavi74viracitaślokaśravaṇe sati 
padapadārtha75saṃskṛtamatın̄āṃ 
tadarthāvagamadarśanāt. ataḥ 
sambandhādhigama76mūlapravṛttinā 
’numānena tasya kaiva 
sāmya77saṃbhāvanā.  
There are two kinds of śabda, words 
and sentences. Of these, a sentence is 
capable of conveying its artha without 
knowledge of a relation, since it is 
observed that competent people 
(saṃskṛtamati) can know the artha upon 
hearing a newly composed verse. Being 
this the case, how can a similarity with 
inference occur, since it (inference) 
operates on the basis of the knowledge 
of a relation? 
                                                             
 
70 Cf. ŚVDva, Pārthasārathi’s Nyāyaratnamālā ad śabda 54: ıd̄ṛśasya śabdasyānumānād bhedaṃ pratijānāti “anumāneneti”. dvidhā 
śābdaṃ, padaṃ vākyaṃ ca. tatra padam abhyadhikābhāvād apramāṇam.  
71 atrābhıd̄hıȳate] P K; tatrābhidhıȳate NMVa  
72 vākyātmākāś ca] P K; vākyātmā ceti NMVa  
73 avabodhayitum] K; avagamayitum NMVa ; P n.a.  
74 -kavi-] K; om. NMVa ; P n.a.  
75 padārtha] K; om. NMVa P n.a.  
76 sambandhādhigama] P NMVa; sambandhāvagama K 
77 tasya kaiva sāmya] P; tasyaikaikarūpatva K; tasya kathaṃ sāmya NMVa  
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Notably, Jayanta’s theory of sentence signification is a modification of the Bhāṭṭa one, 
abhihitānvaya, according to which the meaning of a sentence is produced indirectly, by a combination 
of the designated meanings. Jayanta adds to the picture a contextual factor which he calls tātparya 
(see Graheli 2016). The capacity of competent speakers to compose and understand new sentences is 
one of the main arguments in favour of the abhihitānvaya theory and against the anvitābhidhāna one.  
The case of an analogy of relation may still stand, however, if the signification of single words is 
meant (NMVa, I 404,8-9):78 
padasya tu sambandhādhigamasāpekṣatve 
saty api sāmagrıb̄hedād viṣayabhedāc 
cānumānād bhinnatvam / 
Single words, however, do require 
knowledge of a relation. There is still a 
difference from inference, because of a 
difference in content and formal 
components (sāmagrī).  
 
Having thus discarded the possibility that the artha of a sentence, in the epistemological process 
of śabda, is inferential, in the following sections the discussion pertains to single words.  
 
5 .1 .1 .1 .  The epistemic object  of  s ingle words cannot be inferential  
As explained above (see § 2.2), Jayanta maintains that the referent of words is the possessor-of-that 
(tadvat), thus the content of knowledge derived from single words is quite unlike that of inferential 
knowledge (NMVa, I 404,10-12):79 
viṣayas tāvad visadṛśa80 eva padaliṅgayoḥ. 
tadvanmātraṃ padasyārtha iti ca81 
sthāpayiṣyate. anumānaṃ tu 
vākyārthaviṣayam, atrāgniḥ, agnimān 
parvata iti tataḥ82 pratipatteḥ. uktaṃ ca 
tatra dharmaviśiṣṭo dharmı ̄sādhya iti.  
As far as their epistemic content, a 
word and an inferential mark are 
dissimilar. It will be established how 
the artha of the word is a “possessor-
of-that” (tadvat). Inference, instead, 
has the artha of a sentence as its object, 
                                                             
 
78 Cf. ŚVRa, śabda, 55–56, viṣayo ’nyādṛśas tāvad dṛśyate liṅgaśabdayoḥ / sāmānyaviṣayatvaṃ ca padasya sthāpayiṣyati // dharmı ̄
dharmaviśiṣṭaś ca liṅgıt̄y etac ca sādhitam / na tāvad anumānaṃ hi yāvat tadviṣayaṃ na tat, and ŚVRa, śabda 109, vākyārthe hi 
padārthebhyaḥ sambandhānubhavād ṛte / buddhir utpadyate tena bhinnā sāpy akṣabuddhivat.  
79 Cf. ŚVRa, śabda, 56–57ab: dharmı ̄dharmaviśiṣṭaś ca liṅgıt̄y etac ca sādhitam / na tāvad anumānaṃ hi yāvat tadviṣayaṃ na tat // 
sāmānyād atiriktaṃ tu śābde vākyasya gocaraḥ 
80  visadṛśa] P NMVa; dhisadṛśa K 
81 ca] P NMVa; hi K 
82 tataḥ] P NMVa; om. K 
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because from an inference a knowledge 
in the form of “here [there is] fire; 
[there is] a fire-possessing hill” derives. 
And there83 it was stated that the 
probandum of an inference is a 
property-possessor (dharmin) qualified 
by a property.  
 
The content of an inference involves a dharmaviśiṣṭo dharmı,̄ an unperceived property possessed 
by a perceived locus (pakṣa or dharmin) qualified by a perceived property.84 The content of knowledge 
is thus the already perceived locus qualified by a previously unknown property (e.g., the hill qualified 
by fire); this is the artha of a sentence, not of a single word. One may argue that this is not a sentence, 
but rather a complex word: why do we need to say that “fire-qualified hill” is a sentence? The answer 
is that a necessary condition of a sentence is the satisfaction of expectancy (ākāṅkṣā), which occurs in 
the case of a well formed inference (NMVa, I 405,1-5):85 
nanu padāny api vākyārthavṛttın̄i 
saṃsanti86 gomān aupagavaḥ kumbhakāra 
iti.  
satyam, kintu teṣv api sākāṅkṣatāsty eva, 
padāntaram antareṇa 
nirākāṅkṣapratyayānutpādāt. gomān ka 
ity ākāṅkṣāyā anivṛtteḥ.87 
[Objection] There are also words with 
the function of the vākyārtha, such as 
“owner of cattle, descendant of Upagu, 
maker of pots”.  
[Counter-objection] True, but in those 
there is still expectancy, because 
without other words the fulfilment of 
expectancy is not achieved, since the 
question “which owner of cattle?” is 
not satisfied [until the sentence is 
completed].  
 
                                                             
 
83 In ŚVRa, anumāna 47cd, tasmād dharmaviśiṣṭasya dharmiṇaḥ syāt prameyatā; or in the NM section on inference, see NMVa, I 
309, 10.  
84 In NBhTha, ad 1.1.35 the probandum of an inference is said to be either the property qualified by the property-possessor 
or the property-possessor qualified by the property (sādhyaṃ ca dvividhaṃ dharmiviśiṣṭo vā dharmaḥ śabdasyānityatvaṃ dhar-
maviśiṣṭo vā dharmy anityaḥ śabda iti). In NMVa, I 310, 5, however, the latter option is not accepted.  
85 Cf. ŚVRa, śabda, 59cd: vākyārthe ’pi padaṃ yatra gomadādi prayujyate.  
86 saṃsanti] śaṃsati K; santi NMVa  
87 ākāṅkṣāyā anivṛtteḥ] ākāṅkṣān ativṛtteḥ K 
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5 .1 .1 .2 .  The content of  word-derived knowledge is  the property-possessor,  not the 
possessed property 
A further difference is that in inferences the qualifier of a qualified, i.e., the property of a locus, is the 
object of discovery, while in words-derived knowledge it is the qualified, i.e. the that-possessor 
(NMVa, I 405,6-7): 
api ca parvatādiviśeṣyapratipattipūrvikā 
pāvakādiviśeṣaṇāvagatir liṅgād udeti. 
padāt tu viśeṣaṇāvagatipūrvikā 
viśeṣyāvagatir iti viṣayabhedaḥ.  
Moreover, from an inferential sign 
knowledge of a qualifier such as “fire”, 
arises, based upon [perceptual] 
knowledge of the qualified, such as 
“hill”. From a word, instead, 
knowledge of the qualified arises, 
based on knowledge of the qualifier.88 
Thus there is a different epistemic 
content.  
 
In inferential knowledge, the previously unkwnown entity, i.e., the probandum, is the qualifier 
(e.g., fire), which is known on the basis of the perception of a qualified entity (e.g., the hill). On the 
contrary, in word-derived knowledge the unknown entity that is revealed by the word “cow” is an 
individual ‘cow’ qualified by a generic ‘cowness’. In fact,  
smoke-possessing hill ⊃ f ire-possessing hill 
is quite different from 
“cow” → cowness-possessing cow 
 
Even in the case of a complex word such as “cow-possessor”, the artha would still be an 
individual ‘cow-possessor’ qualified by a generic ‘cow-possessorness’.  
 
5.1.2. Disanalogy of sign 
If śabda were the inferential sign and the artha the probandum, there would still be the need to 
explain the locus of such an inference. Obviously, if śabda is the sign, it cannot simultaneously be the 
locus (NMVa, I 405,8-10), as alleged in § 4.1.2 above:89 
nanu uktaṃ yathā ’numāne dharmaviśiṣṭo [Objection] It has been said that in 
                                                             
 
88 GBhSha, 72: “because from the word “cow” comes knowledge of an individual object qualified by cowness” (gośabdād got-
vaviśiṣṭapiṇḍāvagateḥ).  
89 Cf. ŚVRa, śabda, 62cd–63ab: atha śabdo ’rthavattvena pakṣaḥ kasmān na kalpyate // pratijñārthaikadeśo hi hetus tatra prasajyate / 
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dharmı ̄sādhyaḥ, evam ihārthaviśiṣṭaḥ 
śabdaḥ sādhyo bhavatu.  
maivam, śabdasya hetutvāt. na ca hetur 
eva pakṣo bhavitum arhatıt̄i.  
inference the object to be known is a 
property-possessor qualified by the 
property. Here [in the case of śabda], 
similarly, the probandum is a śabda 
qualified by an artha.  
[Counter-objection] It cannot be so, 
because in your inference śabda was 
supposed to be the inferential sign, and 
a sign cannot be the locus as well.  
 
An inference in which the locus and the probans are the very same entity, in fact, would be 
absurd:  
If śabda possesses śabda, śabda possesses artha 
This śabda possesses śabda 
Therefore this śabda possesses artha 
 
The objector may than argue (see § 4.1.5) that the śabda inference is analogous to that in which 
the probandum ‘fire’ is inferred as a property possessed by the locus ‘smoke’, from the probans 
‘smoke-ness’ (NMVa, I 405,11-406, 3):90 
nanu91 yathāgnimān ayaṃ dhūmaḥ, 
dhūmatvāt, mahānasadhūmavad, ity 
uktaṃ92 “sā deśasyāgniyuktasya 
dhūmasyānyaiś ca kalpitā” ity evaṃ 
gośabda evārthavattvena sādhyatām. 
gatvādi93sāmānyaṃ ca hetūkriyatām iti.  
[Objection] “This smoke possesses fire, 
because of smoke-ness, like the smoke 
in the kitchen”. It is said “others 
postulate that this [object to be known, 
prameyatā] is the locus (deśa, here 
synonym of pakṣa) “smoke” endowed 
with fire”. Similarly, the very word 
gauḥ, possessing the property of its 
artha, is the thing to be inferred, and 
the universal [of the phonemes] gatva, 
etc., is the sign.  
                                                             
 
90 Cf. ŚVRa, anumāna 47cd–48ab: tasmād dharmaviśiṣṭasya dharmiṇaḥ syāt prameyatā // sā deśasyāgniyuktasya dhūmasyānyaiś ca 
kalpitā, where the proposal that deśa is smoke is attempted. Cf. also GBhSha, 72: sā deśasyeti prameyatā, pūrvasminn ardhe “ta-
smād dharmaviśiṣṭasya dharmiṇaḥ syāt prameyatā”. Moreover, cf. ŚVRa, śabda, 63cd: pakṣe dhūmaviśeṣe hi sāmānyaṃ hetur iṣyate 
// 
91 nanu] atha K 
92 uktaṃ] uktañ ca K 
93 gatvādi] gośabdatvād ityādi NMVa  
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If smoke possesses smoke-ness, then it possesses fire 
This smoke possesses smoke-ness 
Therefore this smoke possesses fire 
 
Such an inference would be analogous to  
If śabda possesses gatvādi, then it possesses ‘cow’ 
This śabda possesses gatvādi 
Therefore this śabda possesses ‘cow’  
 
The problem, here, is that if śabdatva (e.g., gatvādi) were the probans and śabda (e.g., gauḥ) the 
locus, what exactly would the probandum be? Jayanta here opens a trilemma (NMVa, I 406,3-5):94 
kiṃ arthaviśiṣṭatvaṃ95 sādhyate 
artha96pratyāyanaśaktiviśiṣṭatvaṃ vā 
arthapratıt̄iviśiṣṭatvaṃ vā97.  
[Counter-objection] What would then 
be the object of knowledge [of such an 
inference]? Would it be [the locus 
śabda] qualified by (1) the artha, (2) by 
the capacity to cause knowledge of the 
artha, or (3) by the cognition of the 
artha? 
 
5 .1 .2 .1 .  An artha  cannot be possessed by a  śabda  
The first, most obvious option is that the probandum is the artha possessed by the śabda (NMVa, I 
406,6-12):98 
na tāvad arthaviśiṣṭatvaṃ sādhyam, 
śailajvalanayor iva śabdārthayoḥ 
dharmadharmibhāvābhāvāt. 
athārthaviṣayatvāc 
chabdasyārthaviśiṣṭatety99 ucyate, tad apy 
ayuktam, tatpratıt̄ijananam antareṇa 
tadviṣayatvānupapatteḥ. pratıt̄au tu 
To begin with, the probandum cannot 
be the qualification by the artha, 
because between śabda and artha there 
is no property-possessor relation such 
as the one between fire and hill. An 
artha such as ‘cow’ is not ontologically 
resting on the word “cow”. If one were 
                                                             
 
94 The following passage summarizes the options discussed in ŚVRa, śabda 66–77.  
95 arthaviśiṣṭatvaṃ] arthaviśiṣṭavattvaṃ Ppc; arthaviśiṣṭatvaṃ vā NMVa  
96 artha] om. NMVa  
97 arthapratıt̄iviśiṣṭatvaṃ vā] arthaviśiṣṭatvaṃ K 
98 Cf. ŚVRa, śabda 65cd–66ab: kathaṃ cārthaviśiṣṭatvaṃ na tāvad deśakālataḥ // tatpratıt̄iviśiṣṭaś cet paraṃ kim anumıȳate / 
99 -viśiṣṭatety] -viśiṣṭas sa ity K 
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siddhāyāṃ kiṃ tadviṣayatva100dvārakeṇa 
taddharmatvena. yadi tu 
tadviṣayatvamūlā101 
taddharmatvapūrvikārthapratıt̄iḥ102, 
arthapratıt̄imūlaṃ ca103 tadviṣayatvam, 
tad itaretarāśrayam. tasmān 
nārthaviśiṣṭaḥ śabdaḥ sādhyaḥ.  
to argue that śabda is qualified by the 
artha because artha is the content of 
the cognition generated by it, this 
would be improper, because until its 
cognition is generated, the (artha) 
cannot possibly be the content of the 
cognition. And once the cognition has 
been generated, what is then the 
purpose of being the property by being 
the content? If the cognition of the 
artha, caused by being a property [of 
śabda], is based on being the content 
[of the cognition], and if being the 
content of the cognition needs to be 
preceded by the existence of the 
cognition of the artha, then there is a 
circular argument. Therefore the 
probandum cannot be the śabda 
qualified by the artha.  
 
The reductionist tries to requalify the relation of possession in terms of “being the content of”. 
This may be legitimate, because, as explained in Bhattacharyya 2001, 177, in Indian inferences the 
occurrence-exacting (vṛttiniyamaka) relation between probans and locus, the “relation of possession”, 
does not need to be the same of the one between probandum and locus, in other words it can be 
asymmetric. Jayanta, however, argues that the result of the inference, namely that ‘cow’ is the 
content of the cognition generated by gauḥ, needs to be known before the inference is performed, 
which leads to a petitio principii. Even if accepted, the inference would thus be trivial, if not 
superfluous. The problem of explaining the acquisition of the general law of concomitance would 
remain, although a well-formed inference could be formulated:  
If śabda possesses gatvādi, then it possesses (i.e., its content is) ‘cow’ 
This śabda possesses (i.e., in it the universal gatvādi inheres) gatvādi 
Therefore this śabda possesses (i.e., its content is) ‘cow’ 
                                                             
 
100 viṣayatva] viṣaya K 
101 mūlā] mūla P; mūlatvaṃ K 
102 -pūrvikārthapratıt̄iḥ] -pūrvakā K 
103 ca] om. NMVa  
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5 .1 .2 .2 .  The capacity of  making the artha  known cannot be possessed by the śabda  
The second alternative is that the probandum is that śabda possesses the capacity to generate 
knowledge of the artha (NMVa, I 406,13-15):104 
nāpy arthapratyāyanaśaktiviśiṣṭaḥ, 
tadarthitayā śabdaprayogābhāvāt. na 
śaktisiddhaye śabdah kathyate śrūyate ’pi 
vā. arthagatyartham evāmuṃ śṛṇvanti ca 
vadanti ca.  
Nor is śabda qualified by the capacity to 
cause knowledge of the artha, because 
it is not used for this purpose 
(tadarthitayā): śabda is not uttered and 
heard for the sake of proving a 
capacity; rather, [people] hear and 
utter a śabda only with the purpose of 
knowing the artha”.  
 
Using a word to cause knowledge of the capacity of generating knowledge of the artha is 
obviously not the common use of language. The inference is in itself valid, but it cannot be the 
inferential process of learning from words, i.e., of knowing an artha, though it may be used to describe 
the process of learning from words: 
If śabda possesses gatvādi, then it possesses the capacity of generating knowledge of ‘cow’ 
This śabda possesses gatvādi 
Therefore this śabda possesses the capacity of generating knowledge of ‘cow’  
 
5 .1 .2 .3 .  The knowledge of  the artha  known cannot be possessed by the word 
The third alternative is that the probandum is “knowledge of the artha” possessed by śabda (NMVa, I 
406,16-19):105 
nāpy arthapratıt̄iviśiṣṭāḥ śabdaḥ pakṣatām 
anubhavitum arhati 
siddhyasiddhivikalpānupapatteḥ. asiddhayā ’pi106 
tadvattvaṃ śabdasyārthadhiyā katham. 
siddhāyāṃ tat107pratıt̄au vā kim anyad 
anumıȳate.  
Nor can a śabda, when qualified by knowledge 
of the artha, enjoy the status of locus, because 
of the impossibility to solve the dilemma: has 
[the cognition of the artha] been 
accomplished or not [before the inference 
takes place]? If knowledge of the artha has 
                                                             
 
104 Cf. ŚVRa, śabda 66cd: na pratyāyakaśaktiś ca viśeṣasyānumıȳate.  
105 Cf. ŚVRa, śabda 75–77: tasmād utthāpayaty eṣa yato ’rthaviṣayāṃ matim / tatas tadviṣayaḥ śabda iti dharmatvakalpanā // tatra 
vācakatāyāṃ vaḥ siddhāyāṃ pakṣadharmatā / na pratıt̄yaṅgatāṃ gacchen na caivam anumānatā // gamakatvāc ca dharmatvaṃ 
dharmatvād gamako yadi / syād anyonyāśrayatvaṃ tu tasmān naiṣāpi kalpanā // 
106 pi] hi K 
107 tat] ca K 
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not yet occurred, how could śabda possess 
that [knowledge of the artha] (tadvattvam, i.e. 
arthapratıt̄ivatvam)? And if such knowledge 
has already occurred, what is then left to be 
inferred? 
 
As in § 5.1.2, the inference would be trivial, because “knowledge of ‘cow’ ” would already be 
present before the inferential process begins: 
If śabda possesses gatvādi, then it possesses (i.e., it generates) knowledge of ‘cow’ 
This śabda possesses gatvādi 
Therefore this śabda possesses knowledge of ‘cow’ 
 
The defect of tautology in the inference, however, could be charged also to common inferences 
such as the smoke-fire one, because prior knowledge of the invariable concomitance is a feature of 
any inference (NMVa, I 407,1-4):108  
jvalanādāv api tulyo vikalpa iti cet, na hi 
tatrāgnir dhūmena janyate, api tu 
gamyate. iyaṃ tv arthapratıt̄ir janyate 
śabdenety asyām eva 
siddhāsiddha109vikalpāvasaraḥ. tasmāt 
tridhāpi na śabdasya pakṣatvam  
[Objection] The same argument could 
be raised in the case of ‘fire’, etc.  
[Counter-objection] No, because the 
property ‘fire’ is not generated by 
smoke, but rather known [by it]. 
‘Knowledge of the artha’, instead, is 
generated by śabda, so there is scope 
for the dilemma of accomplishment or 
non accomplishment, if it is considered 
the property of the locus śabda. 
Therefore, in any of the alternatives of 
the trilemma, śabda cannot have the 
status of locus.  
 
                                                             
 
108 Cf. ŚVRa, śabda 80–82: dhūmavān ayam ity evam apūrvasyāpi jāyate / pakṣadharmamatis tena bhidyetottaralakṣaṇāt // na tv atra 
pūrvasambandhād adhikā pakṣadharmatā / na cārthapratyayāt pūrvam ity anaṅgam itaṃ bhavet // na ca dharmı ̄ gṛhıt̄o ’tra yena 
taddharmatā bhavet / parvatādir yathā deśaḥ prāg dharmatvāvadhāraṇāt // 
109 siddhāsiddha] siddhāsiddhatva NMVa  
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There is a further inconsistency in the status of locus of śabda: according to Nyāya, śabda is 
ephemeral by nature and as such cannot possibly be the locus of something that lasts in time (NMVa, I 
407,5-9):110 
api ca gośabde dharmiṇi111 
gatvādisāmānyātmakasya hetor grahaṇaṃ 
tato vyāptismaraṇam tataḥ parāmarśaḥ 
tato ’rthapratipattir112 iti 
kāladrāghıȳastvād dharmı ̄tirohito bhavet. 
na parvatavad avasthitis tasyāsti,113 
uccaritapradhvaṃsitvāc114 chabdasya.  
Moreover, if the word gauḥ were the 
property-possessor (i.e. the locus 
possessing the property to be inferred), 
due to the span of time elapsed, the 
property-possessor would have 
disappeared: the inferential sign 
constituted by the universal gatvādi is 
grasped; then the necessary 
concomitance (between gatvādi and 
artha) is remembered; then there is the 
inferential reasoning (parāmarśa); then 
there is knowledge of the artha. That 
[locus, i.e. the word gauḥ] has no 
stability through time, unlike a hill, 
because śabda disappears right after 
having been uttered.  
 
Even common sense speaks against the notion of śabda as the locus of the artha (NMVa, I 407,9-
11): 
na ca śabdam arthavattvena lokaḥ 
pratipadyate. kintu śabdāt pṛthag 
evārtham iti na sarvathā śabdaḥ pakṣaḥ. 
ato dharmaviśiṣṭasya dharmiṇaḥ 
sādhyasyehāsaṃbhavāc chabdaliṅgayor 
mahān viṣayabhedaḥ.  
People do not conceive śabda in terms 
of possessing the artha, but they rather 
regard artha as something quite 
distinct from śabda; hence a śabda 
cannot possibly be a locus. Therefore, 
since here the object of knowledge 
cannot be a property-possessor 
qualified by a property, there is a huge 
difference in the epistemic content of 
śabda and inferential signs.  
                                                             
 
110 This reason is not found in Kumārila, who, as a Mım̄āṃsaka, conceived śabda as permanent and not ephemeral (cf. the 
Nyāya-Mım̄āṃsā debate in the commentaries on Mım̄āṃsā Sūtra 1.1.6–23). Kumārila discussed the undesired consequences 
arising from śabda as a permanent liṅga in ŚVRa, śabda 87–89.  
111 dharmiṇi] dharmiṇi sādhye K 
112 -pratipattir] pratıt̄ir K 
113 tasya asty] tasya / api tu NMVa ; om. K 
114 -pradhvaṃsitvāc] pradhvaṃsitvaṃ NMVa  
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The opponent claimed (see § 4.2) that there is also a similarity of causal components in the 
inferential and verbal processes. Jayanta points to the substantial differences in this respect (NMVa, I 
407,12-408, 2):115 
sāmagrıb̄hedaḥ khalv api. 
pakṣadharmānvayādirūpasāpekṣam 
anumānaṃ vyākhayātam. śabde tu na116 
tāni santi117 rūpāṇi. tathā ca śabdasya 
pakṣatvapratikṣepān na taddharmatayā 
gatvādisāmānyasya liṅgatā. na cārthasya 
dharmitvam118 
siddhyasiddhivikalpānupapatteḥ.  
There is certainly a difference also in 
its components (sāmagrı ̄). Inference has 
been explained as something that 
requires formal aspects (rūpa)119 such 
as a property of the locus, a relation of 
agreement (anvaya), and so on. These 
characteristics, however, are not found 
in śabda. And similarly, since the 
notion that śabda is the locus has been 
discarded, the universal gatvādi, etc., 
cannot be the inferential sign that is a 
property of that śabda. Nor can the 
artha be a property-possessor (dharmin, 
i.e. the locus), because the two 
hypotheses of completeness and 
uncompleteness are both untenable.  
 
5.1.3. Disanalogy of property-possessorship 
In § 4.1.5. it was argued that śabda possesses both a śabdatva, intended as phonemic sound, and the 
corresponding artha. Yet, śabda cannot be the locus, as shown above. The reverse, the possibility of 
the artha being the locus, is absurd, because an artha cannot possibly be the substratum of the śabda 
(NMVa, I 408,2-408, 3):120 
na ca taddharmatvaṃ śabdasya śakyate Nor can śabda have the character of 
                                                             
 
115 Cf., for the first part, ŚVRa, śabda 98: tasmād ananumānatvaṃ śābde pratyakṣavad bhavet / trairūpyarahitatvena tādṛgviṣayavar-
janāt. For the second part, cf. ŚVRa, śabda 68–69ab, tasmād arthaviśiṣṭasya na śabdasyānumeyatā / kathaṃ ca pakṣadharmatvaṃ 
śabdasyeha nirūpyate // na kriyākartṛsambandhād ṛte sambandhaṃ kvacit, and ŚVRa, śabda 72cd, […] tasmān na pakṣadharmo ’yam 
iti śakyā nirūpaṇā // 
116 na] P NMVa; om. K 
117 santi] P NMVa; om. K 
118 dharmitvam] P NMVa; dharmatvam K 
119 Here rūpa may recall Dignāga’s trairūpya rule, the three conditions of a valid inference.  
120 Cf. ŚVRa, śabda 74cd: na taddeśādisadbhāvo nābhimukhyādi tasya vā // 
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vaktum, tatra vṛttyabhāvāt being the property of the locus, 
because it (śabda) does not reside in it 
(in artha).  
 
One could then argue that although the artha is not in a spatial relation with the śabda, it has a 
causal relation with ‘knowledge of itself’ and could thus be the locus of ‘knowledge of the artha’ 
(NMVa, I 408,3-408, 5):121 
tat122pratıt̄ijanakatvena tu123 
taddharmatāyām ucyamānāyāṃ pūrvavad 
itaretarāśrayam.124 
pakṣadharmādi125balena pratıt̄iḥ. 
pratıt̄au126 ca satyāṃ 
pakṣadharmādi127rūpalābhaḥ.  
If the status of being its (of the artha) 
property is explained has the causation 
of its [own] cognition, then there is 
again the same circular argument as 
before: the cognition [of the artha] is 
there on the strength of being the 
property of the locus; the property of 
the locus is known [only] once the 
cognition [of the artha] is already 
there.  
 
As before, there would be a petitio principii:  
If an artha possesses gauḥ, then it possesses cognition-of-‘cow’ 
This artha possesses gauḥ 
Therefore this artha possesses cognition-of-‘cow’ 
 
Even common sense dictates that an artha does not have a natural relation with a śabda, unlike 
the smoke-fire relation, so that by mere observation one could grasp the relation of signification 
(NMVa, I 408,6-408, 9):128 
                                                             
 
121 Cf. ŚVRa, śabda 75–77: tasmād utthāpaty eṣa yato ’rthaviṣayāṃ matim tatas tadviṣayaḥ śabda iti dharmatvakalpanā // tatra vāca-
katāyāṃ vaḥ siddhāyāṃ pakṣadharmatā / na pratıt̄yaṅgatāṃ gacchen na caivam anumānatā // gamakatvāc ca dharmatvaṃ dharmat-
vād gamako yadi / syād anyonyāśrayatvaṃ hi tasmān naiṣāpi kalpanā // 
122 tat] P K; om. NMVa  
123 tu] P K; om. NMVa  
124 itaretarāśrayaṃ] P; itarāśrayaṃ K; itaretarāśrayaḥ NMVa  
125 -dharmādi] P NMVa; -dharmatādi K 
126 pratıt̄au] P NMVa; tatpratıt̄au K 
127 -dharmādi] P NMVa; -dharmatādi K 
128 Cf. ŚVRa, śabda 78: na cāgṛhıt̄asambandhāḥ svarūpavyatirekataḥ / śabdaṃ jānanti yenātra pakṣadharmamatir bhavet // 
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api ca yady arthadharmatayā śabdasya 
pakṣadharmatvaṃ bhavet, tadā129 
anavagatadhūmāgnisambandho ’pi yathā 
dhūmasya parvatadharmatāṃ gṛhṇāty 
eva130 tathā 
’navagataśabdārtha131sambandho ’py 
arthadharmatāṃ śabdasya gṛhṇıȳāt. na ca 
gṛhṇātıt̄y132 ato nāsti pakṣadharmatvaṃ 
śabdasyeti.  
Moreover, if śabda were the property of 
the locus, i.e. of the artha, then, just 
like someone perceives smoke as a 
property of the hill, even if he does not 
know the smoke-fire relation [and thus 
cannot perform the inference], in the 
same way someone could grasp śabda 
as a property of the artha, even without 
knowing the śabda-artha relation. But 
this does not happen, so śabda cannot 
be the property of the locus.  
 
5.1.4. Disanalogy of relation 
The relation of concomitance between a śabda and its artha, taken for granted by the opponent (§ 
4.1.3), is not warranted. In actuality there is no concomitance, neither spatial, nor chronological 
(NMVa, I 408,10-15):133 
anvayavyatirekāv api tasya durupapādau, 
deśe kāle ca134 śabdārthayor 
anugamābhāvāt. na hi yatra deśe śabdaḥ 
tatrārthaḥ. yathoktaṃ135 śrotriyaiḥ, 
“mukhe hi śabdam upalabhāmahe bhūmāv 
artham” iti. vayaṃ tu karṇākāśe136 
śabdam137 upalabhāmaha ity āstām etat. 
nāpi yatra kāle śabdaḥ tatrārthaḥ, idanıṃ̄ 
Also the relation of agreement and 
difference is hardly tenable, since 
there is no co-existence of śabda and 
artha, neither in time nor in space. For, 
it is not that wherever there is a śabda, 
there is also its [corresponding] object. 
As said by the ritualists (śrotriyas): “[…] 
because we perceive śabda in the 
                                                             
 
129 tadā] NMVa; tad K; P n.a.  
130 eva] P NMVa; om. K 
131 śabdārtha] P NMVa; om. K 
132 gṛhṇātıt̄y] P NMVa; gṛhṇāty K 
133 Cf. ŚVRa, śabda 86: yatra dhūmo ’sti tatrāgner astitvenānvayaḥ sphuṭaḥ / na tv evaṃ yatra śabdo ’sti tatrārtho ’stıt̄i niścayaḥ // Cf. 
also ŚVRa, śabda 65cd, kathaṃ cārthaviśiṣṭatvaṃ na tāvad deśakālataḥ, as well as Pārthasārathi’s Nyāyaratnamālā thereon, whe-
re the Yudhiṣṭhira example is found: kena sambandhenārthaḥ śabdaṃ viśinaṣṭi. na tāvad ekadeśakālatayā, yudhiṣṭhiraśabda-
deśakālayor yudhiṣṭhirasyābhāvād ity āha —katham iti. The quote attributed to the śrotriya-s is found, verbatim, also in ŚBh, ad 
1.1.5 (See Frauwallner 1968, 36, 23).  
134 ca] P NMVa; pi K 
135 yathoktaṃ] P NMVa; tathoktas K 
136 karṇākāśe] P NMVa; karṇāvakāśe K 
137 śabdam] P K; śrotram NMVa  
Alessandro Graheli – Bhaṭṭa Jayanta  
212 
 
yudhiṣṭhirārthābhāve ’pi 
yudhiṣṭhiraśabdasadbhāvāt138  
mouth and the object on the ground”, 
though we [Naiyāyikas] know that 
śabda resides in the ear’s ether; so that 
[possibility of a concomitance in space] 
is ruled out. And it is not that 
whenever there is a śabda also the 
object is present: even if in this 
moment the object ‘Yudhiṣṭhira’ is not 
extant, the śabda Yudhiṣṭhira can 
actually be there.  
 
Naiyāyikas hold an externalist view of reference. It is clear that when one speaks of past objects 
these cannot be present while the corresponding words are uttered. The opponent, however, argues 
in favour of an internal concomitance between the mental image of śabda and its artha. In reply, 
Jayanta raises a dilemma and the argument of the superfluosness of such an inference (NMVa, I 
408,16-409, 3):139 
atha140 śabdārthayoḥ anvayābhāve ’pi 
tadbuddhyor anvayo grahıṣ̄yata ity 
ucyate.141  
tarhi vaktavyam. kiṃ arthabuddhāv 
utpannāyām anvayo gṛhyate 
anutpannāyāṃ vā. anutpannāyāṃ142 tāvat 
svarūpāsattvāt kuto ’nvayagrahaṇam. 
utpannāyāṃ tv arthabuddhau kim 
anvayagrahaṇeneti naiṣphalyam. 
tatpūrvakatve tu pūrvavad 
itaretarāśrayam. etena vyatirekagrahaṇam 
api vyākhyātam.  
[Objection] Even when the [spatial or 
chronological] concomitance of śabda 
and artha is not there [as in the 
Yudhiṣṭhira example], the 
concomitance between their mental 
representations can still be grasped.  
[Counter-objection] Then the following 
should be clarified: is the relation of 
agreement (anvaya) grasped when the 
cognition of the artha is already 
effected, or when it is not yet effected? 
When it [the cognition of the artha] is 
not yet effected, since its very 
existence is not there, how could the 
agreement be grasped? If the cognition 
                                                             
 
138 sadbhāvāt] P NMVa; saṃbhāvāt K 
139 Cf. ŚVRa, śabda 93–96: nāṅgam arthadhiyām eṣā bhaved anvayakalpanā / anvayādhın̄ajanmatvam anumānasya ca sthitam // jñāte 
pratıt̄isāmarthye tadvaśād eva jāyate / paścād anvaya ity eṣa kāraṇaṃ katham ucyate // tasmāt tannirapekṣaiva śabdaśaktiḥ pratıȳate 
/ na ca dhūmānvayāt pūrvaṃ śaktatvam avagamyate // vyatireko ’py avijñātād arthāc chabdadhito yadi / so ’pi paścāt sthitatvena nār-
thapratyayasādhanam // 
140 atha] P K; artha NMVa  
141 grahıṣ̄yata ity ucyate] P NMVa; grahıṣ̄yeta ity cet K 
142 anutpannāyāṃ] P NMVa; anutpannāṃ K 
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of the artha is effected, instead, there 
would be superfluity [of the inferential 
process]: what would be the use of 
grasping a relation of agreement? And 
if it (grasping the agreement) is based 
on that [prior existence of the 
cognition of the artha], then, as before, 
there is a petitio principii. The same 
applies to the relation of difference 
(vyatireka).  
 
The opponent argues that the relation of agreement and difference is normally applied in the 
common process of language acquisition, by subtraction and addition, so in that context the process 
of induction has indeed a role. Jayanta answers that in that context the function of agreement and 
difference is used to acquire the conventional relation between a śabda and its artha while learning a 
linguistic usage, and not to generate knowledge of the artha in a subsequent application of that 
linguistic usage (NMVa, I 409,4-409, 9): 
nanu āvāpodvāpadvāreṇa 
śabdarthasambandhe niścıȳamāne 
upayujyete evānvayavyatirekau. 
yathoktam “tatra143 yo ’nveti yaṃ śabdam 
arthas tasya bhaved asau” iti 
satyam etat. kintu samayabalena 
siddhāyām arthabuddhau 
samayaniyamārthāv anvayavyatirekau. 
śabde na144 anvayavyatirekakṛtaiva145 
dhūmāder iva146 tato ’rthabuddhiḥ.  
[Objection] When the śabda-artha 
relation is ascertained on the basis of 
the phenomenon of addition and 
subtraction, agreement and difference 
are indeed used. As it was said, “there 
(in the operation of addition and 
subtraction) some śabda (i.e., an 
ending) is put in relation with another 
śabda (i.e. the stem); the artha shall be 
of that [śabda]” (ŚVDva, vākya 160ab).  
[Counter-objection] This is true. Yet, 
while the cognition of an artha is 
achieved on the strength of a 
convention, a concomitance by 
agreement and difference has the 
purpose of fixing (niyamārtha) that 
                                                             
 
143 tatra] Pac K; yatra Ppc NMVa  
144 śabde na] P NMVa; om. K 
145 -kṛtaiva] P K; -kṛtā ca NMVa  
146 iva] P K; ivāgneḥ NMVa  
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convention (samaya). In śabda, 
knowledge of the artha does not derive 
directly from a concomitance by 
agreement and difference, as it instead 
happens with smoke etc.  
 
Thus Jayanta seems to concede that in the process of language acquisition there is an inferential 
process at play.  
There is a further difference between śabda and inference. Unlike the knower who infers fire 
from smoke, the hearer of the word gauḥ knows the artha ‘cow’ because he has been trained in this 
linguistic usage (NMVa, I 409,10-410, 5. See also GBhSha,72-73):147 
api ca / dhūmādibhyaḥ pratıt̄iś ca 
naivāvagatipūrvikā / ihāvagatipūrvaiva 
śabdād utpadyate matiḥ // 
sthaviravyavahāre hi bālaḥ148 śabdāt 
kutaścana / dṛṣṭvārtham149 avagacchan 
taṃ svayam apy avagacchati // yatrāpy 
evaṃ samayaḥ kriyate, “etasmāc chabdād 
ayam arthas tvayā pratipattavya” iti, 
tatrāpi pratıt̄ir eva kāraṇatvena nirdiṣṭā 
draṣṭavyā //  
Moreover, knowledge [of the 
probandum] originated from 
[inferential marks such as] smoke, etc., 
is not based on a previous learning 
(avagati). Here, instead, the knowledge 
[of an artha] originated from śabda is 
certainly preceded by learning [the 
language]. For, a learner, having 
observed and learnt the designation of 
an artha from a given śabda by 
observing the usage of competent 
speakers, knows that [artha] later on”. 
Even when the conventional relation is 
taught [ostensively] in the form of 
“from this śabda you ought to know 
this artha”, knowledge [of the artha] 
should be regarded as caused [by 
śabda].  
 
The point here is that while inferential processes can be initiated independently by a rational 
knower, verbal knowledge requires a competence acquired either from the ostensive teaching of 
competent speakers or, more indirectly, from the observation of their linguistic usages (see 
GBhSha,73).  
                                                             
 
147 Cf. ŚVRa, śabda 90: naivam apy asti dṛṣṭo hi vināpy arthadhiyā kvacit / vācakapratyayo ’smābhir avyutpannanarān prati // 
148 bālaḥ] P NMVa; dṛṣṭvā K 
149 dṛṣṭvārtham] P NMVa; bālo ’rtham K 
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This closes the rebuttal of the reductionist’s attempt of construing a śabda-artha inference 
(NMVa, I 410,5-8):150 
tasmād anyo liṅgaliṅginor avinābhāvo 
nāma sambandhaḥ, anyaś ca śabdārthayoḥ 
samayāparanāmā vācyavācakabhāvaḥ 
sambandhaḥ pratıt̄yaṅgam. evaṃ151 
viṣayabhedāt sāmagrıb̄hedāc ca 
pratyakṣavad anumānād anyaḥ śabda iti 
siddham //  
Therefore, one thing is the relation 
among inferential signs and inferential 
objects, called “invariable 
concomitance”, another is the relation 
between signified and signifier, called 
“conventional relation” between śabda 
and artha, as a factor of knowledge. 
Thus it has been proven that, because 
of their different object of knowledge 
and of their different components 
(sāmagrı ̄), śabda, like perception, is 
distinct from inference.  
 
5.2. The Sāṅkhya defense of śabda is inconclusive 
As for the Sāṅkhya defense of āptavacana mentioned in § 4.2, Jayanta agrees (with Kumārila) about 
their inconclusiveness and bluntly dismisses them (NMVa, I 410,9-10):152 
yat tu 
pūrvavarṇa153kramāpekṣaṇādivailakṣāṇya
m āśaṅkya dūṣitam, kas tatra phalguprāye 
nirbandhaḥ 
As for the points raised after noticing a 
difference [between śabda and 
inference] on the basis of the 
requirement of the sequence of 
previous phonemes etc., what is the 
use of writing about that superfluous 
issue? 
 
                                                             
 
150 Cf. ŚVRa, śabda 97–98: sambandhaṃ yaṃ tu vakṣyāmas tasya nirṇayakāraṇam / syād anvayo ’tirekaś ca na tv arthādhigamasya tau 
// tasmād ananumānatvaṃ śabde pratyakṣava bhavet / trairūpyarahitatvena tādṛgviṣayavarjanāt // 
151 evaṃ] P K; evaṃvidha- NMVa  
152 Kumārila’s dismissal is even harsher: bhedaḥ sāṅkhyādibhis tv iṣṭo na tūktaṃ bhedakāraṇam (ŚVRa, śabda, 15cd), and paroktā 
hetuvaś cātra [=sāṅkhyadarśane] nābhedasya nivāritāḥ (ŚVRa, śabda, 35ab).  
153 -varṇa] P NMVa; om. K 
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5.3. Refutation of the Buddhist arguments 
5.3.1. The universal of trustworthiness 
As for the Buddhist argument (§ 4.3.1), in which authoritativeness was proposed as the inferential 
sign in the alleged inferential process of śabda, Jayanta replies (NMVa, I 411,1-411, 10):154 
yat punarabhihitam, 
“āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyād 
anumānatā” iti, tad atıv̄a subhāṣitam, 
viṣayabhedāt. āptavādatvahetunā hi 
śabdārthabuddheḥ prāmāṇyaṃ sādhyate, 
na tu saiva janyate. yathāha.155 anyad eva 
hi satyatvam āptavādatvahetukam / 
vākyārthaś cānya eveha jñātaḥ 
pūrvataraṃ hi156 saḥ // tatra157 ced 
āptavādena158 satyatvam anumıȳate / 
vākyārthapratyayasyātra kathaṃ syād 
anumānatā // janma tulyaṃ hi buddhın̄ām 
āptānāptagirāṃ śrutau / 
janmādhikopayogı ̄ca nānumāyāṃ 
trilakṣaṇaḥ iti // 
It was said, that “[śabda has] the 
character of inference because of the 
undisputedness of an authoritative 
statement”, this was very well said, 
because of the difference of epistemic 
content. In fact, by the probans 
“authoritativeness of the statement” 
the validity of the knowledge of the 
artha of śabda is proven; it is not so that 
such knowledge is generated [by this 
probans]. As it was said (ŚVDva, vākya 
244-246): “One thing is truth, which is 
inferred through the authoritativeness 
of the statement, another thing is the 
artha of the sentence, which is known 
before [its truth]. In this context, if 
what is inferred through the 
authoritativeness is truth, how can 
knowledge of the artha of the sentence 
have an inferential nature? Because, 
cognitions produced from 
authoritative or unauthoritative 
statements arise in the same way; in 
this inference even [a probans] 
satisfying the three required criteria 
(trilakṣaṇa) is not useful to explain 
anything more than the origin [of 
knowledge from śabda, i.e., the 
acquisition of linguistic competence, or 
                                                             
 
154 Cf. ŚVRa, śabda 47: āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyān nṛvacassu hi / lakṣaṇenānumānatvāt prāmāṇyaṃ siddhim ṛcchati // 
155 yathāha] Pac K; yad āha Ppc NMVa  
156 hi] Pac K; ca Ppc NMVa  
157 tatra] P K; tataś NMVa  
158 ced āptavādena] P NMVa; vedāptavādena K 
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the intention of the speaker]”.159 
 
The inference proposed by this reductionist runs as follows:  
If an artha possesses (i.e., is caused by) authoritative-statement-ness, then it possesses 
undisputedness 
This artha possesses authoritative-statement-ness 
Therefore this artha possesses undisputedness  
 
It is clear that since the artha is the locus it must be known in advance, to make the inference 
possible.  
Here Taber (1996: 26) renders ŚVDva, 244 slightly differently: “The truth [of a sentence], based on 
the trustworthiness of the author, is one thing, the meaning of the sentence, which is known prior [to 
its truth], another”. It is important to ponder how this verse would be read, respectively, from a 
(Mım̄āṃsaka) viewpoint of intrinsic validation and from a (Naiyāyika) one of extrinsic validation. 
Taber (1996: 26-27), indeed, anchors the core of his argument about an acceptance of two levels of 
knowledge from śabda —non-committal and committal— to this principle of extrinsic validation, 
while discussing this quotation of the ŚV by Jayanta: 
Nyāya considers the truth of a cognition to be known extrinsically, that is, after the 
cognition has arisen by means of confirmation by other cognitions. Thus, Jayanta would 
appear to have the notion of an initial belief evoked by language itself that things are a certain way 
followed by an explicit awareness that one’s belief is indeed true [A.G.: emphasis by Taber].  
 
Elsewhere, Jayanta explicitly writes that the principle of extrinsic validation applies also to 
testimony (NMVa, I 420). As for the application to perceivable artha-s, Jayanta seems to suspend his 
judgement on whether such knowledge is intrinsically or extrinsically validated, while he states that 
in the case of non-perceivable artha-s knowledge is extrinsically validated (NMVa, I 436).  
After quoting the three ŚV verses, however, Jayanta continues by saying that verbal knowledge 
is not simply an impression, but rather a definite cognition, as evident from common experience 
(NMVa, I 411,11-12): 
na ca prāmāṇyaniścayād vinā 
pratibhāmātraṃ tad iti vaktavyam, śabdād 
One cannot say that without the 
ascertainment of the validity of 
                                                             
 
159 On janmādhikopayogı,̄ see GBhSha,73. 
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artha160saṃ161pratyayasyānubhavasiddhat
vāt.  
knowledge there is only an impression 
(pratibhā), because the full knowledge 
of the artha caused by śabda is proven 
by experience.  
 
This dychotomy between “impression” and “firm knowledge”, and the assertion that the latter, 
and not the former, is experienced upon hearing a statement, seems to confirm that “The Naiyāyikas 
were against the deployment of such a basic attitude [of non-committal understanding of words] 
prior to the belief-claim or knowledge claim that arises in the hearer” (Matilal 1994: 355), and that 
“When Nyāya uses that expression [A.G.: śabdabodha] it simply means knowledge from words which is 
the standard case, i.e., knowledge that p gathered from someone’s asserting that p” (Chakrabarti 1994: 
121). Taber (1996: 27), too, concedes this, “for Jayanta himself insists that the initial awareness evoked 
by a sentence is not a “mere intuition” (pratibhāmātra) but a “definite cognition” (sampratyaya)”.  
By reading the passage in context, therefore, Taber’s argument is not strengthened, especially 
with the addition of this last sentence; it thus seems that also for Jayanta knowledge of śabdārtha, i.e., 
śabdabodha,  
simply means knowledge from words which is the standard case, i.e., knowledge that p 
gathered from someone’s asserting that p. The distinction is not drawn in terms of truth 
or falsity or correctness or incorrectness. There is no tendency in Nyāya to hold that 
word-generated awareness is always knowledge. We can have false belief generated by 
believingly comprehended false sentences (Chakrabarti 1994: 121).  
 
5.3.2. The inference of the speaker’s intention 
Lastly, the Buddhist inference of the intention of the speaker (§ 4.3.2) was presented. Such an 
inference, however, does not lead to the knowledge of the artha (NMVa, I 412,1-8): 
etena vivakṣāviṣayatvam api pratyuktam. 
na hi vivakṣā nāma śabdasya vācyo 
viṣayaḥ kintv artha eva tathā.162 
vivakṣāyāṃ hi163 śabdasya liṅgatvam iha 
dṛśyate / ākāśa iva kāryatvāt na 
vācakatayā punaḥ // śabdād uccaritāc ca 
By this [last argument, that knowing 
the truth of a statement and knowing 
the artha are two distinct processes], 
also the possibility that the speaker’s 
intention is the probandum [of an 
inference having śabda as its probans] 
                                                             
 
160 śabdād artha] Ppc K; śabdārtha Pac NMVa  
161 saṃ] P NMVa; om. K 
162 tathā] P NMVa; om. K 
163 hi] P NMVa; tu K 
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vācyaviṣayā tāvat samutpadyate saṃvittis 
tadanantaraṃ tu gamayet kāmaṃ 
vivakṣām asau / arthopagrahavarjitā ca164 
niyamāt siddhaiva sā jıv̄atāṃ165 
tadvācyārthaviśeṣitā tv avidite naiṣā 
tadarthe bhavet.  
is refuted. For, the content of the 
signification of śabda is not the 
speaker’s intention, but rather the 
artha. Here śabda is the inferential sign 
of the speaker’s intention, because it is 
an effect [of the speaker’s intention], 
like in the case of ether, not because it 
is a signifier [of the speaker’s 
intention]. From an uttered śabda, at 
first the full knowledge of a signified 
artha is generated; then, that [śabda] 
may well convey [through an 
inference] also the intention of the 
speaker, [yielding knowledge of the 
fact] that this [intention] is related to 
living beings, without the grasp of a 
[specific] artha.166 The [intention] 
which is specifically related to the 
signified artha, however, cannot be 
there before the artha is known.  
 
The example of ether is related to Vaiśeṣika ontology: like one infers the imperceptible ether 
from the perception of śabda, because śabda must rest in ether, so one infers that the imperceptible 
intention of the speaker from the perception of śabda.167 The inference from śabda to the intention of 
the speaker, however, is based on a cause-effect relation, not a signifier-signified one. And in any case 
such an inference leads to the knowledge that behind the śabda there is a sentient being with an 
intention.  
If a speaker possesses śabda, then it possesses an intention to speak 
This speaker possesses śabda 
Therefore this speaker possesses an intention to speak  
 
                                                             
 
164 -varjjitā ca] P K; -varjitat tu NMVa  
165 siddhaiva sā jıv̄atāṃ] Pac; siddhaiva sā jıv̄atā K; siddhaiva sā jıv̄itā Ppc; siddhaivam ājıv̄atā NMVa  
166 See GBhSha,73.  
167 Cf. (VD, Vyomavatı ̄, 578): na ca śabdasyānumānatvam eva niṣidhyate, vivakṣākāśādhigame liṅgātvāt. yathā hy ākāśādhigame sar-
vaḥ śabdo’numānaṃ vivakṣākāryas tu vivakṣādhigame ’pıt̄i.  
Alessandro Graheli – Bhaṭṭa Jayanta  
220 
 
Without knowledge of the artha, however, the inference cannot prove that the speaker intends 
to signify that specific artha.  
Taber (1996: 21-23) proposes a refinement of the Buddhist argument, as a chain of inferences, 
qualified as “roughly that of Śrıd̄hara in his Nyāyakandalı”̄: 
Śrıd̄hara sought to interpret Praśastapāda as propounding the more sophisticated 
Buddhist theory: from a word or linguistic sign one does not directly infer its meaning 
but rather the state of mind of the speaker who employs it, and from that — given that 
the speaker is reliable — one infers its meaning.  
 
Taber’s representation can be summed up in the following two inferences:  
If a speaker possesses śabda, then he possesses an intention to speak (vivakṣā) 
This speaker possesses śabda 
Therefore this speaker possesses an intention to speak  
 
If an authoritative speaker possesses an intention to speak, then he possesses knowledge 
of the artha 
This authoritative speaker possesses an intention to speak 
Therefore this authoritative speaker possesses knowledge of the artha  
 
“Finally, from this knowledge on the part of the trustworthy speaker one is able to infer the 
existence of the state of affairs that he knows” (Taber 1996: 21). Taber (1996: 24) sees in the inference 
of the intention an awareness of the “basic idea that thoughts are somehow instrumental in meaning; 
words indicate primarily, or in the first instance, what we are thinking and do not directly refer to 
things”.  
This chain of inferences, however, is not found in the NM and seems to be a post-Jayanta 
development.  
 
6. Conclusions 
6.1. Jayanta and Mım̄āṃsā 
Most of the arguments presented by Jayanta in this section, both the reductionist and the anti-
reductionist ones, are already found in the Ślokavārtika. Jayanta, however, rearranges and discusses 
them in a very clear sequence. Moreover, he adapts them to the Naiyāyika siddhānta by some strategic 
correctives:  
• The artha of individual words is not a universal, as in Mım̄āṃsā, but rather a qualified particular 
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(tadvat).  
• This different understanding of what is the artha of words has an unavoidable impact on the 
analysis of the artha of sentences and of complex words such as gomat (“cow-possessor”) as well.  
• Since in Nyāya the Veda has an author and as such its passages are standard cases of trustworthy 
statements, a specific discussion on the Veda is absent in the NM, while it takes about twenty 
verses in Kumārila’s defense of śabda.  
• In Nyāya, śabda is ephemeral by nature, thus it cannot have stable relations with permanent 
entities and it is not suited as a probans or a locus in Indian inferences. This argument cannot be 
used in Mım̄āṃsā, where śabda is considered permanent.  
• Jayanta concedes that inference is used during the process of language acquisition to establish the 
conventional relation. This argument is only hinted at by Kumārila, since the śabda-artha relation 
in not considered conventional in Mım̄āṃsā.  
• Linguistic competence is a necessary condition to “know from words” and it is used by Jayanta to 
mark the difference between śabda and inference. This argument is not used by Kumārila.  
 
6. 2. Understanding words and knowing from words 
Taber’s argument for an acceptance on Jayanta’s side of a non-committal understanding from words 
is mainly built on the arguments presented here in § 5.3.2 and § 5.3.1. Unlike him, I did not find a 
distinction between understanding and knowing from words in Jayanta’s presentation. Therefore, in 
this respect, I’d rather endorse Matilal’s and Chakrabarti’s opinions. A Sanskrit expression for non-
committal understanding is śabdabodha ‘understanding from words’. Yet I did not encounter this 
expression in old, pre-Jayanta Nyāya sources. 
In general, from the debate analysed in this paper it emerges that śabda was for Jayanta an 
epistemological, rather than a linguistic, phenomenon, and that its artha was an epistemic object. The 
issue of distinguishing linguistic comprehension and testimonial knowledge might have been a 
pseudo-problem in Jayanta’s view of the world, and he would perhaps have agreed with Coady (1994: 
245) in that “if the ability to use language meaningfully is connected with the making of true reports 
then it is surely the consistent making of true reports that matters”. In other words, if the appropriate 
use of language is to communicate truth, there are in principle no “neutral” statements, and false 
statements can be explained in terms of the inappropriate use of language. 
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6.3. The reduction of śabda to inference 
Jayanta starts from the assumption that śabda is an autonomous means of knowledge. Unlike for 
Mım̄āṃsakas, for him the relation between language and reality is established by convention, but in 
its day-to-day usage it is clear that this a priori connection is a necessary condition for linguistic 
communication. At least within the limits of the theory of inference available to him, there were no 
convincing arguments that could have explained a reduction of śabda to perception or inference. He 
was thus justified in thinking śabda as a sui generis epistemic tool.  
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